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For centuries, democratic theorists have been faced with the dilemm a o f reconciling 
majority rule with minority rights. James M adison wrestled with this dilemm a in 
when he participated in the Constitutional Convention in 1789 and later when he 
penned the Federalist Papers and the Virginia Resolution. Years later, Robert Dahl 
studied the same issue in his landmark work, A Preface to D em ocratic Theory. Both 
theorists were concerned with the effects o f groups, with high levels o f intense 
political participation, on the democratic process. M adison feared that intense 
majorities would abridge the freedoms o f m inority groups or individuals. Dahl feared 
that intense minorities might prevent majorities from  controlling the democratic 
process.
This thesis seeks to explain why groups, at certain times, participate in the political 
system w ith high levels o f intensity and at other times, do not. Rights are divided into 
two groups: political rights and economic rights. It is argued that economic rights 
attract higher levels o f intense participation because they are rights which exhibit 
zero-sum characteristics. Political rights attract less intense participation because 
they do not exhibit the characteristics o f rivalry and have a tendency to attract “free­
riders”.
The conclusions are that by using an econom ic/political rights paradigm  to study the 
w ay people react to the allocation or defense o f rights, democratic theorists will be 
able to predict when intense conflicts will arise. Therefore, rules and institutions 
could be created that m ediate intense conflicts by creating non-majoritiarian rules 
when intense conflicts might arise.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“The Problem of Intensity of Economic Interests in M adison 's and D ahl's Theory of
Democracy”
Historically and theoretically, democracy is a work in progress. Socrates, and 
the Greeks, first introduced the world to the idea of democracy. Over 2000 years 
later, theorists such as James M adison, and later Robert Dahl, are still trying to come 
to terms with what democracy actually means. Democracy is, at best, an ambiguous 
concept. Even today, there is only limited consensus on what characteristics a nation 
m ust exhibit in order to be labeled a democracy.
In one sense, democracy is a process. However, the w orld’s understanding of 
democracy, as a process, is also ever changing. W hat the Greeks called democracy 
would not be recognizable as democracy to the modem day American, and vice versa. 
The Greeks had a limited sense of suffrage and “elected” people through a lottery. 
Today, there is a greater expectation of choice with respect to selecting our 
representatives. Because democracy is an ambiguous concept, there has been a 
continual effort to understand the nature of democracy. Political scientists seek to 
create models that will explain and predict how people will behave in democratic 
societies. This work intends to offer an explanation for one aspect of the democratic 
process. This thesis will exam ine how levels of intensity, with respect to political 
participation, are affected by the characteristics a right exhibits. If the rights exhibit 
the characteristics o f a public good, the public will exhibit less intensity. If the rights
exhibit the characteristics of a private good, the public will exhibit more intensity. A 
more complete definition of public and private goods follows.
It is the intention o f this thesis to accomplish three things. First, to reconcile 
Robert D ahl’s concept o f polyarchy with M adison 's concept of democracy. Second, 
to argue that rights can be sub-divided into two groups: political rights and economic 
rights, and, that by classifying rights into two groups, it might help explain why. in 
democracies, people react with differing intensities to different types of policy issues. 
This is not to imply that all rights fall into a category o f either a purely economic or 
purely political rights. Rather, there is a spectrum which spans from purely economic 
to purely political. M ost rights will fall somewhere in between the two extremes. The 
reason for classifying rights into two groups is to suggest that issues that revolve 
around the concept o f economic liberty attract such a high level o f intensity that a 
political majority becomes more difficult to achieve than with issues that revolve 
around political liberties. From the standpoint o f democratic theory, such a 
hypothesis would help explain why, at times. American democracy functions 
smoothly, while at other times, American democracy gridlocks into inaction. The last 
chapter will engage Dahl in a “conversation” . In essence, this thesis will try to 
extrapolate from D ahl’s body of work, with regards to dem ocratic theory, how he 
would respond to this tension between economic rights and political rights. Each of 
these three steps will be elaborated upon.
This thesis will attempt to explain an additional portion o f the democratic 
process that Dahl and M adison neglected. To do this, a clear definition o f democracy 
is needed. It is not my intention to offer a new definition of democracy. This thesis
will only try to reconcile M adison 's views o f democracy with D ahl’s views. In order 
to limit the scope of the inquiry, the study will be limited to the American experience 
with democracy. The foundation o f American democracy can be best explained or 
described by the works of James Madison. As the main philosophical force behind 
the drafting o f the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, M adison has a unique 
understanding o f A m erica’s democratic system. However, the democratic process has 
evolved since Madison. In order to update democratic theory1, an attempt will be 
made to reconcile D ahl’s interpretation o f democracy with M adison 's plan for a 
democratic republic.
The second part o f the thesis will argue that M adison and Dahl failed to 
develop a holistic theory o f democracy because they failed to develop the differences 
between economic rights and political rights. This idea is the additional aspect of 
democratic theory that will be explained. It will be suggested that there exists two 
types o f rights; economic rights and political rights. And, in order to fully understand 
how American democracy functions, dem ocratic theorists must be able to understand 
how and why people react differently towards the allocation o f each type of rights.
One possible explanation may already exist. Econom ists have already developed 
theories which explain why people react with different intensities to different types of 
econom ic goods. It may be possible to use those ideas to explain why people react 
differently to unique types o f “political goods” .
1 M adison was writing before the industrial revolution and Dahl was writing 
after the industrial revolution. Dahl will make the argument that “corporate 
capitalism ” changed the way democracies functioned.
For years, econom ists have tried to explain the nature of the economic 
marketplace. They have developed theories which explain how incentive structures 
dictate the way people behave in the economic marketplace." In addition, political 
scientists, such as Joseph Schumpeter, have also tried to develop theories which 
explain how people behave in the “political m arketplace"/ In this sense, a political 
marketplace refers to the process by which voters compete for goods and services 
provided by the United States government and politicians com pete for votes from the 
populace. It can be assumed that ju st as suppliers and buyers in an economic 
marketplace react to differing incentive structures, legislators and voters in the 
political marketplace also react to similar incentive structures.
In the tradition o f public choice theory, which “employs the analytic tools of 
economics to understand and evaluate political processes"4 this thesis will specifically 
describe one type o f econom ic theory and superimpose that theory on the political 
marketplace. Econom ists have used collective action theory to explain why people 
react differently to the allocation o f public goods as opposed to the allocation of 
private goods.5 W ith that distinction in mind, it is possible to suggest that political
2 Garrett Hardin. “The Tragedy o f the Com m ons” (SCIENCE 162, No. 1, 
1968), 1244-46.
3 Joseph Schumpeter. Capitalism, Socialism and Dem ocracy  (New York: 
H arper and Brothers, 1942), 291.
4 Edward Zelinsky. “James M adison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A 
procedural defense o f tax expenditures” Yale Law Journal 102. no. 5 (March 1993).
5 Ronald Cose. “The Problem o f Social C ost,” Journal o f Law and Economics 
3, (Oct 1960), 37.
rights have the same characteristics as public goods and economic rights have the 
same characteristics as private goods. This concept is also relevant to M adison and 
Dahl. Dahl argues that when people seek to provide public goods they are acting in 
the interests o f the general community. Thus they are exhibiting traits which promote 
civic virtue. However, when people begin to pursue private goods or economic 
rights, they begin to ignore civic virtue. As a result. D ahl’s pluralism  becomes a 
double-edged sword. Pluralism  can promote civic virtue, or it can ignore civic virtue 
in favor of personal interest.6
Economic collective action theory argues that public goods have the 
characteristics o f non-rivalry, non-divisibility and non-excludability.7 In essence, this 
means that public goods can not be used up, people can not be denied access to them 
and they can not be divided up. As an example, a lighthouse is a public good. If 
person A looks at the light, he does not consume the light, leaving less light for 
person B. Also, person A cannot be denied the use o f the lighthouse, even if he did 
not contribute to its production costs. And last, percentage shares o f the light cannot 
be allocated to person A and person B. All people receive 100% of a public good, or 
nothing.
In contrast, private goods have none o f the above characteristics. For instance, 
land is a private good. Land is subject to rivalry. For every acre that person A buys, 
that is one less acre that person B has available to purchase. Also, land is excludable.
6 Robert Dahl and Edward Tuffte. Size and Democracy (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1973).
7 Harvey Rosen. Public Finance (Illinois: Irwin, 1988), 62-63.
If person A buys an acre o f land, person B can be denied access to that land. And last.
land is divisible. Person A and person B can own different amounts of land, whereas
person A and Person B can not own different amounts of light produced bv the
lighthouse. Madison understood the concept of rivalry. His definition of faction and
his understanding o f how they would interact suggest that he understood that many
political decisions would not be reached through a cooperative effort. In many ways.
M adison’s definition of factionalism implies that all political processes are a zero-
sum game and that the civic virtue Dahl is concerned with does not truly exist. Lester
Thurow, an economist, also sees the effects o f zero-sum games on the democratic
process. He writes,
[zero-sum games] force a democracy into a no-win situation where, 
whatever it decides about the ju st distribution o f resources, there will 
be a large number, perhaps a majority, o f unhappy voters. Distributional 
issues are highly contentious and precisely the kind of issues that 
democracies find it most difficult to solve. It is not we versus them. 
but us versus us in a zero-sum game.8
It will be the assertion o f this thesis that collective action theory can be 
effective in explaining the political marketplace and thus effective in explaining 
specific aspects o f dem ocracy in general. For example, free speech, a political right, 
is also not subject to rivalry, divisibility or excludability. However, an economic 
benefit, such as a research grant, is subject to the above three characteristics.
This thesis will exam ine, to what extent this distinction between political and 
economic rights or “goods’ is im portant to democratic theory and how can it be used 
to explain how people actually behave. Dahl, a strong advocate of the behavioral
revolution with in political science, feels it is important to understand what motivates 
citizens to act. It is helpful to understand to what extent Dahl would support such a 
distinction. He has dedicated a large amount o f his scholarship to showing why a 
pure majoritarian system is not always successful. Dahi would probably welcome 
another attempt to explain the effects of political participants who have a 
disproportionate amount of political power on the dem ocratic process. He would also 
be interested in understanding why certain groups have a disproportionate amount of 
power. Although he may not agree with every aspect o f the hypothesis presented in 
this work, there is evidence that he would understand the logic of the hypothesis.
The third part of the thesis will postulate that political rights, like public goods 
suffer from a “free rider” problem. Conversely, economic rights, like private goods, 
do not have a “free rider” problem. A free rider is someone who understands that a 
good or service will most likely be produced with or without his or her contribution. 
Based on that knowledge, the individual will tend not to contribute to the production 
costs, knowing that the good or service will be non-excludable. We avoid the free 
rider problem when allocating public goods by making taxes mandatory. However, in 
the realm o f politics, and the “allocation” o f “political rights." there is no process to 
enforce participation. Therefore, if an individual feels that a political “right” being 
pursued by a specific faction in the United States will exhibit the characteristics of a 
public good, that individual will have a greater tendency to be a free rider. Although 
no attempt will be made to em pirically measure the free rider problem, it will be
8 Lester Thurow. The Zero-Sum Society (New York: Penguin Books, 1980),
18.
8
argued that this phenom enon directly affects the level of intensity with which people 
participate in our political system. It will be suggested that the allocation or 
enforcem ent o f political rights, such as free speech or public safety, which have a free 
rider problem, will attract less intense participation by the public than the allocation 
o f economic rights, such as budgetary' allocations, will attract a higher level of 
intensity with respect to political participation. In turn, one could then argue that with 
respect to the allocation of economic rights, there is a greater likelihood of tyranny of 
the minority.
Other political theorists, as it pertains to participation levels, have touched on 
the distinction between economic rights and political rights. In 1975, Crozier, 
Huntington and Brittan postulated that “excess participation” could lead to an 
“overload” of the democratic process.9 They noted that such a phenom enon would 
most likely occur when the political system tried to deal with “popular economic 
dem ands.” Piven and Cloward identify an entire school of thought which revolves 
around the concept o f “non-participation” .10 The general argument this school puts 
forth is that over participation can ham per leaders ability to be flexible and lead to a 
“crisis of dem ocracy” .11
W ith respect to the ambiguous nature of the term ‘intensity’, this thesis will 
not attempt to suggest a “norm al” level o f participation. Nor will it suggest a “good”
9 As cited in, Richard Cloward and Frances Piven. Why Am erican's D on't 
Vote (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), 23.
10 Ibid., 24.
11 Ibid., 24.
or “bad" level o f participation. Dahl, in his A Preface to Democratic Theory.
understood the difficulty in empirically measuring intensity. However, he did argue
that, as a concept, intensity is a useful tool to help in the understanding of democratic
political systems. The goal of this thesis will be to offer the idea that intensities are
affected by the type of right being allocated and attempt to examine how Dahl might
react to such a suggestion.
In the final section of the thesis Dahl will be drawn “back into the
conversation.” By looking for evidence within D ahl’s writings, an attempt will be
made to explain how Dahl would react, support or criticize the hypothesis. This type
of methodology is one Dahl uses, quite frequently, himself. In A Preface to Economic
D em ocracy, Dahl proposes a theory with respect to the democratization o f the
economic firm. He seeks to determine if de Tocqueville would find his theory
acceptable. He writes,
Although de Tocqueville was in my view a great political theorist, he was 
not the kind of theorist who deals explicitly with the sons of questions 
raised in the paragraph above. His theory is often implicit, deeply 
em bedded in its context, and highly qualified. The attempt to make his 
theory more explicit, less contextual and less qualified, as I do here, 
is to attribute to him a theory that he him self might have found 
acceptable. 12
W hat Dahl does with de Tocqueville, this work will do with Dahl. Specifically, there 
will be an investigation as to how Dahl would respond to the notion that intense 
minorities pursuing econom ic rights have an inordinate amount of influence in the 
political process. It will also be necessary to engage Dahl in a “dialogue” with respect
to normative questions. For instance, when discussing intense minorities with 
inordinate amounts o f power, the question arises, are intense minorities detrimental to 
dem ocracy? W hat is an inordinate amount o f power? Is it detrimental to democracy 
if an apathetic majority dominates an intense minority? These questions require a 
value judgm ent in order to answer them.
The conclusion o f the thesis will make the argument that understanding how 
intensity o f participation affects the political process is im portant to understanding 
how democracies actually function. Furthermore, if it can be assumed that 
understanding the nature o f intense participation is important, then it can also be 
argued that understanding the factors which effect intensity levels is also important.
In conclusion, the thesis will seek to offer one possible explanation as to why 
different groups and individuals react with different intensities at different times in 
the democratic process, depending on whether the process is allocating economic 
resources or enforcing political rights.
i ̂'  Robert Dahl. A Preface to Economic Democracy (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1985), 8.
CHAPTER 2 
“M adison 's D ilem m a”
James M adison is considered the “Father of the United States Constitution.” ' 
Robert Dahl is considered by many political scientists to be the preeminent 
democratic theorist o f modem  tim es.2 M adison is credited with creating a significant 
portion o f the American democratic system 3 and Dahl is credited with critiquing large 
portions of the system that M adison helped create. Therefore, it is important to first 
reconcile D ahl’s view o f dem ocracy with M adison’s. First, a brief synopsis of 
M adison’s view o f dem ocracy will be provided. Next, D ahl’s criticisms of M adison 
will be exam ined, followed by an attempt to highlight areas of agreement between the 
two theorists. Lastly, the contributions o f their respective democratic theories will be 
assessed.
W hen looking at the philosophies of M adison it is im portant to examine a 
wide array o f documents. Some theorists have made the mistake of focusing too 
narrowly on Federalist #  10 as the sole source for understanding M adisonian 
thought.4 It is necessary to look at, not only all the Federalist Papers written by 
M adison, but also to look at his notes on the Federal Convention, his letters to various 
political leaders and friends and other public documents which he authored, such as 
the Virginia Resolution.
1 Irving Brant, Jam es M adison: The Virginia Revolutionist (New York: 
Bobbs-M errill Co., 1941), xi.
2 Luciano Pye. “Review o f Democracy and Its Critics” (American Political 
Science Review 84, no. 9), 627.
•3
LanceBanning, The Sacred Fire o f Liberty  (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 
19959,8.
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The reason for reconciling the views of Dahl and M adison, as opposed to two 
other democratic theorists, is based upon several factors. First, both M adison and 
Dahl were concerned with the power of competing groups in political society. 
Second, both theorists were concerned with the abilities of those groups to tyrannize 
the rest of society. M ost importantly, both theorists developed solutions with respect 
to controlling the pow er of group. However, their solutions were not the same. By 
reconciling the views o f the two theorists, one can develop a strong sense of how 
groups, both minority and majority groups, influence politics. And, one can begin to 
exam ine methods and dem ocratic processes to control the power of groups.
At the outset, it is im portant to note that M adison, like Dahl, was not 
com pletely consistent over his entire life. It would be incorrect to assume that James 
M adison’s writings, while a member o f Congress operating under the Articles of 
Confederation, will reflect his exact sentiment while he was Secretary o f State or 
later, President o f the United States. In fact, it has been argued that there is an 
obvious discontinuity between the M adison o f the 1780s and the M adison of the 
1790s.5 It is im portant to remember that in addition to being a political theorist, 
M adison was also an active politician most of his adult life. The same M adison that 
argued for more centralized power as a member o f the Continental Congress and 
Constitutional Convention, also penned the Virginia Resolution which laid the
4 Ibid., 4.
5 Joshua Cohen. “Review Symposium” Journal o f Politics 53, No. 1 (Feb 
1991), 215.
theoretical foundation for concepts such as state nullification and succession.6 
M adison supported Thom as Jefferson’s purchase of Louisiana because it would 
increase the diversity o f interests in the United States and thus increase the number of 
factions which was im portant in M adison’s scheme to “control the mistiefs of 
faction.”7 However, he opposed Alexander H am ilton’s proposal for a national bank 
because such a move would create an overly broad interpretation of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause. These contradictory arguments, with respect to the limits of 
federal power, indicate the com plexities of M adisonian thought.
In response to such criticisms, it could be argued that M adison was one the 
most consistent Founders. James Read suggests that M adison’s consistency can be 
found in his unwavering defense o f civil liberties.8 He contends that historians 
misunderstand M adison because they focus upon his inconsistent support o f federal 
and state powers.9 However, Read argues that M adison foremost concern was for 
civil liberties and therefore attacked state and federal power equally in their defense. 
This is not to say that M adison was a libertarian. He believed there was a legitimate
6 James Smith, The Republic o f  Letters (London: W W  Norton & Co., 1995),
1072.
7 James M adison. Federalist Papers #  10 (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1982),
45.
8 James Read. “Our Com plicated System” Political Theory 23, No. 3 (August 
1995), 456.
9 Lance Banning, a noted biographer o f M adison suggests that M adison was 
influenced by his participation at the convention in Philadelphia as much as he 
influenced the meeting. He argues, “Studies of the Constitutional Convention rightly 
stress the powerful effects o f M adison’s original proposals. It may be equally 
important to ask how M adison was influenced by the framing of the Constitution.” In 
fact, many scholars refer to the “evolution of his founding vision.”
14
role for government. He was consistent in that he wanted checks on the state 
governments if  the small geographical size of the states did not create enough factions 
to prevent tyranny o f the majority. At the same time, he wanted checks o f the federal 
government to prevent invasions into realms he thought should be beyond the 
political process.
Like M adison’s thoughts, there is also an evolutionary nature to D ahl’s 
scholarship. In the 1950s, Dahl was simply offering new interpretations with respect 
to the way pluralist democracies functioned.10 Towards the end o f his career, he was 
advocating a dem ocratization of economic firm s.11 Jack Nagel, from the University 
o f Pennsylvania, writes, “there is some truth to Jefferey Issac’s contention that the 
pluralist Dahl o f 1948 through 1965 is an aberration from the dem ocratic-socialist 
ideas evident in his later works.” 12 Nagel adds that it is often difficult to determine if 
Dahl is a defender o f democracy, or a critic. D ahl’s scholarship moves from an 
amoral approach to politics to study o f politics which is concerned with normative 
questions about equality or equity and political influence. In the early part of D ahl’s 
career, he advocates the position that the public good will be arrived at via some 
invisible hand mechanism if  all pluralist groups pursue their own self-interests. Later, 
Dahl argues that a pure “Smithian" approach to politics may describe the reality of 
American politics, but that it does not create the ends that dem ocratic countries
10 Robert Dahl, A Preface to Economic D emocracy (Los Angeles: The 
University o f California Press, 1985), 112.
11 Jack Nagle, “Review Sym posium ,” 215.
12 Jack Nagle, “Review Sym posium ,” 226.
15
should achieve. Thus he concludes that there must be some limits on the pursuit of 
self-interest in a pluralist society.
In essence, com paring James Madison to Robert Dahl is not akin to 
com paring two stationary portraits. Their lives and their times dictated growth, 
revision and change o f their philosophical outlooks. These evolutionary changes 
must be considered when attempting to reconcile the views o f the two men.
However, most o f the em phasis of this thesis will be on the context o f their written 
works..
MADISONIAN DEMOCRACY
In his view o f democracy, M adison placed a large emphasis on protecting the 
rights o f minorities and concerned him self with methods o f controlling the adverse 
effects of factions. In addition, he attempted to reconcile an extended republic with 
classic republicanism , and in general, argued that a curtailm ent of the democratic 
process was necessary to insure the survival o f a dem ocratic s ta te .13 These four 
aspects have been highlighted because they are also subjects with which Dahl 
concerned him self within the course of his writings.
It can be easily argued that what sets M adison apart from many other theorists 
o f his day was his concern for protecting the rights o f m inority groups and 
individuals. M adison feared both the possibility o f “tyranny o f the majority” and to 
lesser degree, “tyranny o f the minority.” M adison was less fearful o f “tyranny of the 
minority” because he felt minorities could easily be outvoted. In one o f M adison’s 
more notable speeches to the delegates o f the Constitutional Convention, he argues,
16
The lesson we are to draw from the whole is, that where a majority 
are united by a com mon sentiment, and have an opportunity, the 
rights of the m inor party become insecure. In a republican government 
the majority, if united, have always an opportunity .14
M adison felt that majority tyranny would most often occur at the state level. One
proposal he made at the Federal Convention to prevent such abuses was the “federal
veto.” 15 Again, M adison felt that because states were so small, they would not
encompass enough factions to prevent majority tyranny. A lthough this proposal
became one o f the few o f M adison’s suggestions that was not adopted, it provides
insight into his concern about majority abuses. The federal veto would have allowed
the national governm ent to nullify any state law. M adison’s logic was that such a law
would prevent states from abusing less powerful m inority groups at the state level.
Despite losing the vote for a federal veto, his belief in the need for a federal veto did
come to partial fruition in the form of the federal Suprem acy Clause in Article VI of
the Constitution. This clause coupled with the eventual developm ent o f judicial
review allowed the federal government to overpower state laws.
Another way to protect minority interests was to rem ove some liberty issues
from the voting process.16 In other words, ensure certain rights regardless o f what the
"majority will" or “minority w ill” m ight be. This concept is generally
institutionalized within the functioning o f the Supreme Court. M eaning, the Supreme
13 Banning, The Sacred Fire o f  Liberty, 205.
14 James M adison, Journal o f  the Constitutional Convention  (Chicago: Scott, 
Foresman & Co., 1989), 135.
15 Ibid., 398.
Court eventually assumed the power to veto laws which are contrary to specific rights 
protected by the Bill of Rights. Some historians have argued that the Founding 
Fathers did not envision the practice of judicial rev iew .17 However, James Wilson 
moved for such a power to be invested with the Supreme Court on July 21M at
I o
Philadelphia. M adison seconded the motion and spoke in favor of such a move. In 
addition, it was M adison w ho drafted the Bill of Rights, the ultim ate repository of 
minority and individual rights. In all fairness to M adison’s critics, it should be noted 
that M adison initially objected to the drafting of the Bill of Rights. Eventually two 
influences moved him to change his mind. The first was political expediency. The 
second was the belief that a Bill o f Rights would galvanize public opinion in support 
o f civil liberties and thus act as a check on potential abuses by the government. Such 
a belief is notable because Dahl, like many o f the Anti-Federalists o f M adison’s day, 
suggests that M adison failed to com prehend the im portance o f a homogeneous 
political culture in preventing tyranny o f the majority. However, M adison’s speech in 
support o f the Bill of Rights in Congress weakens such an argument. M adison 
argued,
It m ay be thought all paper barriers against the power o f the community 
are too weak to be worthy o f attention...yet, as they have a tendency 
to impress some degree of respect for them, to establish public opinion 
in their favor, and rouse the attention o f the whole, it may be one means 
to control the m ajority .19
16 James Yoho, “W hat Was Left Unsaid in Federalist #  10” Polity  27 (Summer 
95): 587.
17 Banning, The Sacred Fire o f  Liberty, 398.
18 James M adison, Journal o f  the Constitutional Convention , 118.
19 M adison quoted by James Read, “Our Complicated System ,” 459.
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Finally, no exam ination of M adison’s concern for minority and individual 
rights can be complete without incorporating Federalist #  10. In the essay, M adison 
argues that many past confederations had failed because they contained too few 
protections for m inority groups. He writes “that the public good is disregarded in the 
conflicts o f rival parties; and that measures are too often decided, not according to 
rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party; but by the superior force o f an 
interested majority.”20
Joyce Appleby argues the reason M adison was so concerned with minority 
rights was his fear that in an overwhelming agricultural society, an egalitarian 
political movement could strip wealthy people o f their property.21 She contends that 
Madison saw the open W estern frontier as a natural equalizer o f wealth. However, he 
was also aware that large landed property owners would become a smaller and 
smaller minority. This opened the possibility for the m ajority to seize wealth from 
the aristocratic minority, of which M adison happened to be a member. M uch of 
M adison’s correspondence with Thomas Jefferson suggests that Madison supported 
Jeffersonian notions of an agricultural society.22 M adison 's writing in Federalist #  10 
indicates that he feared possible class conflicts in the future. However, the idea o f an 
agricultural society acting to equalize wealth w as prim arily Jefferson’s idea. It is 
more likely that M adison supported Jefferson’s notions o f an extended frontier in
20 James M adison, The Federalist Papers{Toronto: Bantam Books, 1982), 43.
j
Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and the New Social Order (New  York: New 
York University Press, 1984), 31 - 3 5 .
"" Peter Smith, A Republic o f  Letters, 938-949.
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order to increase the diversity of interests, professions, classes, which is so essential 
to his theories concerning the effects o f factions.
W hether or not M adison was able to adequately balance the rights and powers 
o f the minority and m ajority is subject to debate. O ver 200 years o f American history 
with only a lim ited num ber o f blatant abuses o f the m inority by the majority seems to 
suggest M adison succeeded on some level. The U nited States government has 
survived a number o f secessionist threats, including the Hartford Convention o f 1814 
and the nullification crisis in South Carolina in 1832. The Civil W ar is the notable 
exception: a fact Dahl will point to as evidence that M adison’s system of government 
does not mediate conflicts between majority and m inority factions, but that a 
politically homogeneous society serves that function."
The theories o f  Jam es M adison with respect to majority and minority tyranny 
are also closely tied to the concept of factionalism. The most compact explanation of 
factionalism appears in Federalist #  10. In Federalist #  10, M adison argues factions 
are dangerous because they put self-interest before the public interest, but despite the 
danger they pose, factions should be encouraged to flourish. His rationale is that if 
there are a m ultitude o f factions, the effort needed to unite a num ber of factions in 
order to create a majority is so cumbersome, that such an act will be very unlikely. 
M adison begins by defining a faction24 as,
" Dahl, A Preface to Democractic Theory, 82.
24 Dahl is critical o f this definition because it fails to com pletely define what 
exactly is “adverse to the rights of others.” Dahl reasons that, if too narrowly defined, 
any act by the majority could be considered tyrannous. Yet, if  too broadly defined, 
no act by the majority could be considered tyrannous.
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A number of citizens, w hether amounting to a majority or minority of the 
whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion 
or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent 
aggregate interests of the com m unity.'5
Having defined faction, M adison then argues that factions can not be
eliminated with-out elim inating liberty itself. He writes,
“Liberty is to faction, what air is to fire. But it could not be a less folly 
to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes 
faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation o f air, which is essential 
to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.36
Therefore, it was im portant to M adison to create a system that allowed factions to 
exist, yet at the same time control their destructive nature. He suggests two remedies. 
First, use factions to com bat the influence of other factions. In Federalist #  51, he 
writes, “Ambition must be made to counteract am bition.” In #10 he adds, “the 
smaller the society, the few er probably will be the distinct parties and interests...the 
more easily will they [the majority] be able to execute their plans o f oppression.”27
W hat truly m akes M adison’s ideas, at the time, revolutionary is his suggestion 
that the way to increase the num ber o f factions, and thus lim it the power o f any one 
faction is to create a large republic. Beginning with Aristotle and continuing through 
most 18th century thinkers, the prevalent attitude was that dem ocracies could only 
exist on a small scale.28 The Anti-Federalist frequently cited M ontesquieu’s Spirit o f  
the Laws to support their claim  that democratic nations must be small nations. 
M adison rejects this idea. Again in # 10 he writes,
25 M adison, The Federalist Papers, 43.
26 Ibid., 43.
27 Madison, The Federalist Papers , 46.
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Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety o f parties and interests: 
you make it less probable that a majority o f the whole will have a common 
motive to invade the rights of other citizens.29
Madison made the same arguments at the Federal Convention.
The only remedy is. to enlarge the sphere, and thereby divide the community 
into so great a num ber o f interests and parties, that, in the first place, a 
majority will not be likely, at the same mom ent, to have a common interest 
separate from that o f the whole or the m inority.30
M adison sums up his view by suggesting that a large republic can prevent abuses of
both majority and m inority factions. He claims that m inority factions can always be
defeated by a simple m ajority vote.31 W hereas majority factions will not be likely to
form at all, and if  they do, they will be temporary majorities most likely uniting for
the “public good.”’" “In the extended republic,” M adison exclaim s in Federalist #
50, “and among the great variety o f interests, parties and sects, a coalition of a
majority of the whole could seldom take place on any other principles than those of
justice and the general good.”
At this point it is only important to em phasize three aspects of M adisonian
thought. First, M adison rejected the age old concept that the purpose o f government
is to promote civic virtue.33 He accepted the idea that people are inherently self-
interested and will act on that self-interest even if it means enacting policies harmful
2 8_______, Theories of Democracy, 123
29 M adison, The Federalist Papers, 46.
30 M adison, The Journal o f  the Constitutional Convention, 118.
31 M adison, The Federalist Papers, 46.
32 Ibid., 47.
to other groups in society. Second. Madison rejected the idea that democratic 
governments can only exist and survive on a small scale. He actively prom oted the 
idea that the republic should be a large and diverse society. Third. M adison set 
him self up for an apparent contradiction. Madison argued that a diversity of interests 
will promote dem ocracy and prevent abuses by the governm ent.34 However, he also 
understands that a politically homogeneous society is necessary to prevent massive 
cleavages in society that can result in political gridlock.35 All three of these issues 
will be exam ined in more depth in following chapters.
In the first chapter of A Preface to Democratic Theory. Dahl, like many before 
him, accuses M adison o f being one o f the “great undem ocratic thinkers o f all time.” 
Although it can be argued that this is an exaggeration, M adison did perceive a limit as 
to how “dem ocratic” a government should be. In Federalist #  55, M adison remarks, 
“In all very numerous assemblies, o f whatever characters com posed, passion never 
fails to wrest the scepter o f reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every 
Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.” In Federalist #  14, he refers to the 
“turbulent dem ocracies o f ancient Greece and m odem  Italy.” In Federalist #  10, he is 
more forceful.
Democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention 
have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or the rights 
of property; and have in general been as short in their lives, as they 
have been violent in their deaths.36
33 Peter Smith, A Republic o f  Letters, 566.
34 James M adison, Journal o f  the Constitutional Convention, 117.
35 M ichael Kammen, Foundations o f the U. S. Constitution, 136.
36 M adison, The Federalist Papers, 46.
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However, it should be noted that most o f M adison 's criticisms o f democracy were 
directed at direct forms of democracy. His arguments in favor o f the Virginia Plan 
over the New Jersey Plan at the Constitutional Conventions highlight M adison's deep 
seated support for democracy on a representative level. In addition. M adison viewed 
dem ocracy as more than just majority rule.”  It was as important to M adison to 
protect m inority interests as it was to allow the majority to rule.
M adison was not alone in his feeling towards direct democracy. M any of the 
Founders objected to it as a form of government. George Mason declared at the 
Constitutional Convention that the failure of the Articles o f Confederation was due to 
excesses in dem ocracy.38 M adison supported this argument. On June 6th of the 
Convention he argued, “In Greece and Rome the rich and poor, the creditors and 
debtors, as well as the patricians and plebeians, alternately oppressed each other with 
equal unmercifulness.”39
M adison was not immune to criticism, with respect to being undem ocratic, in 
his own time. Edmund Randolph and Elbridge Gerry refused to ratify the 
Constitution on grounds that it was not democratic enough.40 M any o f the Anti- 
Federalist arguments centered around their objections to the undem ocratic aspects o f 
the Constitution. However, in the next chapter, it can be shown that M adison was not
37 Such an idea distinguishes M adison from other theorists such as de 
Tocquiville who argued that dem ocracy was the “absolute sovereignty o f the 
m ajority.”
ID
M adison, Journal o f  the Constitutional Convention, 117.
39 Ibid., 118.
40 M icheal Kammen, The Foundations o f  the U.S. Constitution, 163.
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an anti-democrat, but simply aware o f the “excesses of dem ocracy” and their ill 
effects.
Last, it is impossible to discuss the political theories of James Madison 
without looking at the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. Earlier, it was mentioned 
that the intensity with which a group pursues an interest might affect the way a 
dem ocracy functions. It is possible that M adison understood this concept early on in 
the development o f the American Republic. M adison was deeply troubled by the 
passage of the federal governm ent’s Crisis Laws, which included the Alien and 
Sedition Acts, during the presidency o f John Adam s.41 Madison saw them as an 
obvious violation o f m inority and individual rights. And yet, each law had been 
passed in the representative dem ocratic process that he had helped create. M adison’s 
concern led to a collaboration with the Vice-President Thomas Jefferson. Together, 
they penned the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions.
Only ten years after the Constitution was ratified, M adison was confronted 
with a situation in which a very passionate m inority was intensely opposed to a law 
passed by a slim  majority. The law, in M adison’s opinion, was a blatant violation of 
the newly enacted Bill of Rights.42 As a result, M adison was faced with a dilemma.
He was forced to consider whether an intense minority has the right to nullify laws 
passed by a majority. In analyzing this historical incident, it is necessary to specify 
what is meant by majority and minority. Obviously, there was a majority in the 
Congress that supported the Crisis Laws. However, the election of 1800 suggests
41 Bordon, Parties and Politics in the Early Republic, 1789-1815, 53.
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there was a majority of citizens in the nation that opposed the law. However, if one 
exam ines this event from a strictly institutional approach, M adison’s dilemm a still 
exists. In the framework of a representative government, a slim  majority enacted a 
law, which was clearly unconstitutional according to Madison, over the objections of 
an intense minority o f representatives.
Jefferson, in his original draft o f the Kentucky Resolution, forcefully argues 
that states do have the right to nullify national laws.43 However, Madison is more 
aware o f the consequences o f such a doctrine. He successfully encouraged Jefferson 
to use more moderate language. M adison himself, however, still had to grapple with 
the issue when he authored his own Virginia Resolution. M adison chose to argue that 
by expanding the grand jury  pool to include people o f all states, there would be more 
protection for civil rights.44 He also called for other states to “denounce” the passage 
of the Alien and Sedition Acts. However, he stops short of calling for states to 
assume the power o f nullification.
The irony for M adison was that he had devised the Constitutional system, in 
part, to prevent state governments from  becoming oppressive towards a minority 
faction. He had argued for a federal veto to prevent such abuses. In 1798 however, 
M adison is faced with a reversal of his own argument. Should the state governments 
or any “significant interest”45 have a veto over federal legislation? Although M adison
42 Ibid., 56.
43 Smith, A Republic o f  Letters, 1072.
" ~ 44 Ibid., 1073.
45 John C alhoun’s term.
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tried to lim it the scope o f his response to simply condem ning the acts as opposed to 
calling for state nullification powers, he succeeded in opening the door for John 
Calhoun and others to argue for doctrines such as ''concurrent majorities”46 In some 
ways, M adison provided ammunition for later politicians to destroy the very Union he 
created.
It is also possible that, from M adison’s perspective, the crisis caused by the 
Alien and Sedition Acts was not a failure of the Constitutional system he helped 
devise, but a failure o f the representatives at the time to properly perform their duties. 
M adison’s dual beliefs in the “public good” and that representatives should “refined 
the views of the public” suggests that he would have expected the Congressional 
representatives to prevent the Crisis Laws from ever being enacted. M adison 
believed that representatives should be responsive to their constituencies, but not 
completely beholden to them. He also felt that representatives should act as a 
“broker” to balance the desires o f their constituency while, at the same time, 
promoting the public good for all citizens. Therefore, if the Federalists had acted as 
“proper” representatives and “refined the views” being created by the hysteria 
surrounding the French Revolution, the Constitutional crisis caused by the Alien and 
Sedition Acts could have been avoided altogether.
Professor Ronald Peters makes exactly this point. In his article, “Political 
Theory, Political Science and the Preface: A Review o f Robert Dahl,” he argues that 
most Federalists felt policy makers should be guided by popular preferences, but only
46 David Huston, A Critical Study o f  Nullification in South Carolina 
(Gloucester: The Henry Warrren Fund, 1896), 125.
after considering other issues such as justice, efficiency and other cultural values.47 
Federalist # 71 highlights the Federalist belief in the “public good.” It states, “The 
republican principle dem ands that the deliberate sense o f the community should 
govern the conduct of those to whom they intrust (sic) the management of their 
affairs.” The essay continues, “it is the duty o f the persons whom they have 
appointed to be the guardians of those interests to w ithstand the temporary 
delusion.”48
An exam ination o f the crisis of 1798 illustrates the com plexity of M adison’s 
political views.. He showed his intense interest in protecting the rights of the minority 
during the Philadelphia Convention. However, he also shows his ambivalence 
towards interfering with majority rule in the context o f his Virginia Resolution. Dahl 
will be forced to grapple with similar issues in his writings 200 years later. W hile 
Madison focused on the limits of States rights, Dahl focused on the rights o f intense 
minorities, regardless of geographic location.
47 Robert Perters, “Political Theory, Political Science and the Preface. The
Political Science Review er  21. No 1. (M ay 1977), 161.
CHAPTER 3
“Reconciling Dahl with M adison"
DAHL’S CRITICISM OF MADISON
Robert Dahl is highly critical of Madison on several fronts. His criticism 
stems from two significant differences o f opinion. First, Dahl has considerable more 
faith in the majority rule. A lthough he is uncomfortable w ith the term ‘dem ocracy’ 
and eventually substitutes the term with “polyarchy,” Dahl adam antly believes that 
the system M adison set up is not democratic enough. Second, Dahl believes that 
inequality of wealth prevents dem ocracies from functioning fairly. M ost o f his major 
works include a call for a redistribution o f wealth or a dem ocratization o f the 
economic firm. Although the above two issues dominate D ahl’s criticism  of 
M adison, they are by no m eans an exhaustive list. Dahl also feels that factionalism (a 
term used to describe M adisonian thought) does not prevent the possibility of 
“tyranny o f the m inority,” distorts the public agenda making process, stabilizes 
economic inequality, and encourages people to ignore the “public good”.
In D ahl’s most notable work, A Preface to D em ocratic Theory, argues that 
M adison did not pay sufficient attention to the possibility o f tyranny o f the m inority.1 
Because M adison gave certain political minorities checks on the political process, 
Dahl will insist that M adison is an antidemocratic theorist. In Federalist #  10, 
M adison suggests that tyranny o f the minority will never occur because of the 
“republican principle” , i.e., the majority can always outvote the minority. However
1 Dahl, A Preface to D emocratic Theory, 9.
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“If it can be show n” Dahl counters, “that the operation of the ‘republican principle’
will not in all cases prevent severe deprivations from being inflicted on the
majority by the minority, then the M adisonian system will not produce a non-
tyrannous republic.”2 Dahl points to the fact that any time a minority of voters can
prevent the m ajority from enacting its preference, that becomes evidence o f tyranny
of the minority. Hence, if a two-thirds m ajority is required for some political action,
then a one-third minority can tyrannize over the majority. Again, Dahl argues,
If determ ination by unanimity and by majority vote are both ruled 
out, it follows that the only remaining alternative is determination 
by the decision of some m inority ...then we should expect any 
m inority with this power at best to em ploy it in its own favor and at 
worst to tyrannize over other minorities and any majority.3
Dahl is simply stating that any institutional requirem ent of a two-thirds vote is
actually granting decision making power to a one-third minority. Such an argument
is an exaggeration. Dahl fails to understand that there is a difference between a
minority vetoing a majority decision and a minority im plem enting its own agenda.
The fact that a m inority o f representatives may have a veto over legislative decisions
does not imply that they can enact their own policies. Obviously, if a one-third
minority can block legislation, a two-thirds m ajority can do the same thing.
Dahl is more accurate when he claims that minorities have the ability to
maintain the status quo. In some cases, where a two-thirds majority is required, a
minority can prevent new legislation and thus cem ent the status quo.
Dahl also im plies that all factions are not created equal. His argument states
that since the developm ent o f “corporate capitalism ” some groups in a factional
2 Ibid., 16.
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society (Dahl prefers the term pluralist society,) have more pow er and influence than
others. In essence, he states that a group can have a disproportionate amount of
power, with respect to the actual number of people in the group, in a pluralist
society.4 He states,
O rganizational pluralism  is perfectly consistent with extensive inequalities. 
A lthough critics often attribute to pluralist theory the assertion that groups 
are equal in their influence over decisions, it is doubtful anyone who might 
be described as a theorist of pluralism has ever made such an assertion.5
Such an argument is not meant to imply that M adison believed all factions were
created equal. Dahl is simply arguing that M adison failed to foresee the industrial
revolution and, therefore, did not realize that the pow er gap between factions could be
considerable. So large in fact, that they could distort the pluralist/factionalist system.
Dahl charges that as economic wealth has become unequally distributed, so
has political power. He claims that in American society a majority o f people may
desire better housing, child labor laws, a removal o f slums and better social security.
However, if  a m inority, consisting of employers, can prevent such action because of
inordinate am ounts o f political power, then American is suffering from tyranny of the
minority. One solution Dahl offers is to insure “political resources o f all organizations
are effectively regulated so that resources are proportional to the number of
members.”6
Dahl takes his arguments one step farther. He claims that not only is 
pluralism not a fair com petition because o f inequalities in wealth and therefore
3 Dahl, D ilem m as in a Pluralist Democracy, 40.
4 Ibid., 40.
5 Ibid., 84.
power, he also suggests that factionalism stabilizes inequality, by promoting the 
status quo, thus preventing any chance that organizational equality will occur.7 By 
organizational equity, Dahl typically means money to mobilize an interest group.
Based on his concern with minority tyranny, Dahl develops his case that 
M adison was an anti-democrat. Dahl understands why M adison created the 
American Constitution in the m anner he did. He argues that M adison hoped to ensure 
that the legislature “acted carefully and wisely, not hastily or foolishly.”8 M adison 
delegated to some m inorities the authority to halt, delay, or modify what might 
otherwise be enacted by a simple, untrammeled majority rule. The rationale for such 
structures was to ensure the protection o f certain fundamental rights. Dahl asserts 
that most second cham bers, like M adison’s Senate, are devised to “rectify errors in 
measures passed by the other house and also to serve as a bastion o f minority rights.”9 
Although protecting fundamental rights is a noble goal, Dahl warns that minority 
power can be used to prom ote other agendas besides protecting civil rights. For 
instance, Dahl fears that some m inorities will enact policies to ensure economic 
domination.
Dahl highlights tw o serious risks associated with a “m inority veto”. First, “it 
is all but impossible to ensure that these special arrangem ents are employed by a 
minority solely to protect their fundamental rights.” 10 And by fundamental rights,
6 Robert Dahl, D em ocracy and Its Critics, 83.
7 Ibid., 170.
8 Ibid., 171.
9 Robert Dahl, Preface to Democratic Theory, 41.
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Dahl does not mean property. He means civil rights. Second, the very rules used to 
prom ote minority protection also prevent the m ajority from changing the rules to 
ensure a more democratic function. Dahl points to the example of the Senate Cloture 
rule. He notes that changing the filibuster rule was so difficult because the minority 
could prevent changing the rules. This example is what Dahl means when he states 
that factionalism  stabilizes inequalities. Once the inequality exists, it becom es very 
difficult to remove the inequality because minorities will have a veto over such 
action.
Dahl pursues the idea o f ‘m inority veto’ in another direction. He argues that
dem ocratic societies with provisions for minority protection promote the status quo.
Thus, by prescribing deadlock in cases of equal division o f preferences 
[or less than a super majority] one is in fact biasing the policy-m aking 
process in favor o f all individuals who prefer policies requiring 
government inaction and against all individuals who prefer policies 
requiring government action.11
Dahl notes that as a result of m inority vetoes, civil rights issues were constantly held
up in the Senate during the 1960s. He concludes that “the one problem  with special
procedures is that they rarely can be counted on to work as they should in order to be
acceptable to democratic criteria.” 12 The democratic criteria Dahl refers to is the
ability o f the “dem os” to maintain final control o f the agenda. In this specific case,
the m ajority could not even bring civil rights legislation to a vote because o f the
power of the filibuster.
10 Robert Dahl, Dem ocracy and Its Critics, 186.
11 Ibid., 65.
12 Ibid., 67.
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Dahl also labels the M adisonian system anti-democrat because it creates a 
“quasi-guardianship’’. Dahl rejects guardianship as proposed by Plato in The 
Republic.13 However, he sees judicial review as a version o f the same philosophy.
His arguments suggest that there is an inverse relationship between the pow er of quai- 
guardians and the power o f a democratic majority to control its own affairs. He 
rejects the claim  that judiciaries protect fundam ental rights above and beyond what a 
federal legislature would d o .14 Dahl identifies several empirical com parative studies 
which indicate that polyarchies without judicial branches and with the pow er to veto 
legislative acts enjoy the same freedom as countries that do have such judiciaries. 
However, Dahl concedes that judiciaries with veto pow er can be made com patible 
with the dem ocratic process if their powers are lim ited to only ruling on issues that 
deal with the protection o f fundamental rights, such as free speech or press.15 In 
general, D ahl’s arguments highlight his continual concern with most processes which 
limit majority rule in any form. He again exhibits a philosophy that suggests he 
supports dem ocratization o f the state [and other associations] far beyond what 
M adison would have supported.
M any theorists have suggested that M adisonian factionalism represents a 
fundamental shift in the way political theorists view the role o f governm ent.16 Most 
political theorists from Aristotle to Rousseau believed that the purpose of 
governments was to develop citizens who would promote civic virtue. Dahl uses the
13 Plato argued that enlightened “philosopher-kings” should rule societies 
because individuals in a democracy failed to make good decisions.
14 Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, 219.
15 Ibid., 342.
term “public good” in place of civic virtue. However, M adison offered a system in 
which all citizens did not need to worry about the public good in order for the system 
to be successful. This philosophy has been called the “politics o f interest.” M any of 
the political writers o f the late 18lh century were influenced by the writings of Adam 
Smith. Like Adam Smith, M adison and many o f his contemporaries felt that 
individuals pursuing their self-interest would, via an invisible hand, create a 
collective civic v irtue.17 Dahl is less sure. In D em ocracy and Its Critics, Dahl poses 
the question, “If republican government depends on the virtue o f its citizens, and if 
virtue consists in dedication to the public good (rather than one 's  own interests), then 
is a republic really possible?” In a short essay written for a com munitarian 
publication, Dahl tries to answer his own question and his answ er appears to be no. If 
developing citizens w ith civic virtue is not possible, then “do the practices and 
institutions o f m odem  democratic governments tend to produce the good-enough 
citizen? The evidence suggests they do not.” 18 Dahl identifies three aspects of 
modem dem ocracies that prevent civic virtue from developing. They are changes in 
scale, an increase in complexity, and an excessive am ount of communication.
Political issues have become more complex in m odem  society. Although the level o f 
education has also increased, it has not increased at the same rate as political 
complexity. As a result, people have a hard time discerning what is in the interest o f 
the “public good.” Last, there is so much inform ation available today, the average
16 Banning, The Sacred Fire o f  L iberty , 297.
17 Appleby, Capitalism and the New Social Order, 96.
citizen can not com prehend all of it, and thus again he/she fails to understand what 
may be in the interests o f the public good.
In order to illustrate his point and continue his criticism o f M adison, Dahl uses 
the example o f union and employee negotiators to highlight the fact that factionalism 
does not promote civic virtue. He creates a scenario in which both groups become so 
involved w ith their own interests they ignore the negative externalities their 
agreements create. His conclusion is that ‘interest politics’ becomes less responsive 
to the demos as a whole and that groups which do not have the resources to mobilize 
are com pletely ignored.
Ironically, early in his career, Dahl was loudly criticized for ignoring 
normative aspects o f his pluralism  model. Such theorists as Theodore Lowi .and Jack 
W alker contend that what Adam Smith did to economics, Dahl did to politics.19 
Sm ith’s invisible hand theory argued that self-interest would produce the public good. 
In many respects, Dahl argues early in his career that interest-group self-interest 
com peting in a pluralist society will also produce the public good. However, Lowi 
and W alker counter that such a model makes political science an amoral science.
O ther theorists have argued that D ahl’s focus on intensity belies important 
ethical considerations. Primarily, why should intensity be rewarded in a political 
system? Simply because a group has a more intense preference about an issue, does 
not mean they have a moral claim  to more consideration in the political process. 
Professor Peters critiques Dahl by arguing that he is more concerned with stability
18 Robert Dahl, “Participation and the Problem of Civic U nderstanding,”
Edited by Amitai Etzoni, Rights and the Common Good(New York: St. M artins,
1995) 261-69.
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than ethical aspects of democracy. Dahl rewards intense groups, not because they
have a moral right to be heard, but because they may cause instability in the system.
Eventually D ahl’s scholarship does become more concerned with normative
issues o f dem ocracy and many of D ahl’s arguments about civic virtue revolve around
a secondary issue, size. Contrary to M adison, Dahl argues that a large republic will
have a detrim ental effect on civic virtue. He makes the argument that as the size of a
nation increases, so does the diversity o f a nation. This, however, reduces the sense
of “com m unity” felt by the citizens. As people become more isolated and focused on
their own self-interests (as the M adisonian system encourages them to) they will have
a reduced sense o f civic virtue. He states,
As the num ber o f persons increases, knowledge o f the public good 
necessarily becom es more theoretical and less practical. It becomes 
more and more difficult for any citizen to know all the other citizens 
concretely. The com munity then is no longer a body of an association 
of friends. It is an aggregate o f distant persons. How is a citizen to 
apprehend the interests o f the people who comprise aggregates like these?20
D ahl’s arguments about the public good lead him into his final confrontation 
with M adison. Like M adison, Dahl is concerned with the concept o f how large a 
democratic nation can be and still be responsive to the populace. M adison is famous 
for his arguments that the republic should be large. In some respects, Dahl agrees. 
However, Dahl has considerable trouble with the practice of federalism. The concept 
o f federalism, at least the form practiced in the United States, allows sm aller groups
19 Theodore Lowi, The End o f  Liberalism  (New York: W .W . Norton & Co.,
1969).
20 Robert Dahl, “Participation and the Problem of Civic Understanding,” 
Edited by Etzoni, Rights and the Common Good , 26.
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to have final control of specific parts of the political agenda.' For exam ple, it is
accepted practice to delegate most authority over public education to state
governments. However, in doing so, the general populace must give up final control
over an issue that is im portant to the collective society. Yet, at the same time Dahl
also feels that federalism  can promote civic virtue in the traditional republican sense.
As a result, Dahl does not reject federalism outright, but he is less convinced
of its merits. His first argument is that federalism in not a prerequisite for a nation to
be democratic. He then flips his question by asking, “Are federalist nations
necessarily undem ocratic?” His response revolves around two issues. The first is his
insistence that in dem ocratic countries, the entire d em o s '' must have the ability to set
the political agenda. “Yet in a federal system,” he argues,
no single  body of citizens can exercise control over the agenda.
D on’t you agree, then, that in a federal system the processes 
by which the people govern themselves can’t even in principle 
ever be fully dem ocratic? '3
He follows up his question with a hypothetical situation. Assume that the general
populace o f the federal nation Sylvania wishes to deal with its pollution problems.
-1 M adison accepts specific pow er delegations to the state as a positive 
development. In Federalist #  46, he notes that strong states will have the ability to 
check the pow er o f an encroaching federal government. M adison’s arguments pose 
an interesting question with respect to this thesis. It will later be argued that small 
minority factions som etim es have the ability to overwhelm an apathetic majority. 
Ignoring em pirical questions for the moment, the normative aspects would focus on 
the question, is it ethical for intense minorities to veto apathetic majorities.
M adison’s acceptance o f a federalist system, in which minority populations in states 
can at times overpow er majorities at the federal level, i.e.,(education issues), suggests 
he would be amenable to such an argument.
"  By which Dahl means all o f the populace, not just certain sub groups (states) 
in a political system.
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One initiative is to ban strip mining in all of Sylvania. However, one province,
Carbonia, within Sylvania, where mining is crucial to the economy, is opposed to
such controls over their vital industry. If the province of Carbonia has the final say,
and can exercise a m inority veto, then Dahl argues that the nation of Sylvania is not
fully democratic. In a real world example, Dahl suggests that the inability of blacks
to acquire civil rights in the southern states before the 1960s is an example of
undemocratic federalism in action.
Dahl is not absolute in his attitude towards federalism. Speaking again in a
hypothetical sense, Dahl asks “is a system more dem ocratic to the extent that it
permits citizens to govern themselves on matters that are important to them ?” Such a
question assumes that “matters that are im portant” will most likely occur at the local
level. This raises the question as to whether people are better represented via a local
government. In an article about M ikhial G orbachev’s inability to prevent the Baltic
republics from seceding from the Soviet Union, Dahl admits that majority rule does
not always work in a federal government. He questions,
Should it [majority rule] obligate those who refuse their consent, not 
because they deny the validity of majority rule within a properly 
constituted dem ocratic unit but because the political unit is itself 
seen as illegitim ate.24
Speaking on behalf o f a hypothetical Lithuanian, he states, “Of course I believe in
majority rule, but the only majority I will agree to obey is a majority o f my people in
my country, (or state)” Dahl concedes that in federal systems the appropriate
majorities are sometimes found in state, provincial or cantonal units.
'  D ahl, D em ocracy and Its Critics, 199.
24 Robert Dahl, “Democracy, M ajority Rule and G orbachev’s Reforms” 
Dissent (Fall 91): 491.
Dahl then highlights the problems with his own argument. First, if democratic 
theory posits that sm aller units are the best venues for deciding issues which are 
important to them, can those smaller units again be subdivided? How long can this 
process continue? Eventually, Dahl foresees a possibility of justifying anarchism. 
Second, m inorities are not necessarily geographic minorities. In democratic 
countries, there is a m inority view on every political issue. Dahl concludes with this 
argument,
If minorities were to have an absolute right to form  an association 
independent of the larger group, at lest on matters most important 
to them, either that right would have to be restricted arbitrarily to 
the members of m inorities occupying an identifiable piece of ground 
or else the right would apply equally to m inorities o f all kinds.25
In the end, Dahl is perplexed by the same issues that confronted Madison. If a system
demands pure m ajoritarian rule, the rights of m inority groups are in danger. Yet, any
attempt to create sub-systems that protect minority interests run the danger of
destroying the dem ocratic process, supporting anarchism and allowing for a the
possibility o f m inority tyranny. O f course, neither M adison nor Dahl argue that the
creation o f sub-systems is the only way to protect minority rights.
DAHL’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY
On one level, Dahl is considered a critic o f M adison. However, on a another 
level, Dahl is simply updating M adisonian democracy. W hen comparing the works 
and philosophies o f the two men, it becomes apparent that both theorists were 
affected by their environm ent. M adison was writing at a time in American history 
when the society was predom inantly agrarian. Furtherm ore, most of the Founding
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Fathers believed that the governm ent's involvement in the redistribution o f wealth 
would be limited.26 In the late 1700s, the federal governm ent’s ability to tax and 
spend was extremely small when com pared to the 1900’s. If anything, most 
republicans of the era feared that government might be used to prevent the acquisition 
o f w ealth.27 They did not foresee the modem welfare state in which government 
became a major source o f wealth. It was the predom inant belief o f the era that 
economics was a self-regulating system. As a result, governm ent’s role in economics 
was confined to regulating interstate commerce, providing stable markets and 
creating uniform  rules to the economic system.
In contrast, Dahl is writing after the industrial revolution has changed the face 
o f American society. By the 1950s, America is an industrialized and urbanized 
nation. In D ahl’s world, the government is deeply involved in regulating the 
economy, redistributing wealth and the federal budget accounts for approximately 
33% of the Gross National Product. Furthermore, Dahl is keenly aware of the 
unequal distribution o f w ealth in the United States. He lives in New Haven, 
Connecticut, a town with extrem e wealth and extreme poverty. The differences 
between M adison’s environm ent and D ahl’s environm ent may account for their 
different interpretations o f democracy.
25 Ibid., 493.
Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and the New Social Order, 88.
27 Ibid., 34.
The inequality of wealth caused by m odem  econom ic systems influenced
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D ahl’s to focus his concern on the concept o f “intensity o f preference.”'  Democratic
procedures do not record how intensely a citizen prefers option A over option B. In
contrast, in the market system, we can not only determine that a person may prefer
product A over product B, but we can also determine the level o f preference by noting
how much more a person is willing to pay for product B. However, a vote by itself
does not record intensity. In essence, political equality, “one man, one vote” denies a
citizen the ability to register w hether he/she slightly prefers option A to option B or
w hether he/she is ready to revolt if option A is not chosen over option B.
By making ‘most preferred’ equivalent to ‘preferred by m ost’ we 
deliberately bypassed a crucial problem: what if  the m inority of 
voters prefers its alternative much more passionately that the majority 
prefers a contrary alternative? Does the majority principle still make
r,29sense?
Dahl is asking a normative question. Do intense minorities have more rights than 
apathetic minorities or apathetic majorities? M ore importantly, should democratic 
systems allow for some institutional process to account for intense minorities? If the 
answer to these questions is yes, then something besides majority rule must be 
developed in dem ocratic states. Dahl calls such a rule the Qualified M inority Rule. It 
would allow for intense minorities to prevail over m ajorities in specific instances. 
However, Dahl understands the difficulties with such a concept. Primarily, how does 
one measure intensity? How much more intense does the preference have to be in 
order to justify denying the majority its preference?
->o
" Similarly, Calhoun focused on the same concept during the years prior to 
the Civil War.
29 Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory , 52.
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Dahl fails to ask a more important question. By creating a “Qualified
M inority Rule” he is creating his own version of minority tyranny, a concept for
which he roundly criticizes M adison for doing. In fact, critics of Dahl have gone so
far as to suggest that pluralism  is nothing more than M adison 's factionalism  dressed
up in behavioral jargon .30
However, in this instance, Dahl asks these questions, not because he is critical
o f M adison, but because he wants to understand how the dem ocratic process actually
works, not how theorists believe it should work. His major criticism  o f populist
democracy is that as a theory, it fails to predict political behavior and the government
decision making process.31 Dahl is quick to note that M adisonian democracy did not
prevent the Civil War. The issues surrounding the Civil W ar attracted high levels of
political participation and extremely intense views on both sides. M ajority rule did
not keep the South in the Union and minority protections did not alleviate fears by
southerners that their rights would not be protected. In contrast, the W hiskey
Rebellion, also an exam ple o f an intense minority disagreeing with federal policy, did
not lead to a schism in American society deep enough to threaten the Union. Dahl
argues that differences in the size o f minorities, the intensity in which minorities and
majorities hold their beliefs are all part o f understanding how the democratic process
works. In D ilemmas o f  P luralist Democracy he asks.
Political conflicts form patterns o f such bewildering variety as to defy a 
concise summary. How strong or intense is the antagonism between the 
contestants? Do they see one another as enemies locked in a struggle for 
survival, or at the other extreme as friends, or fellow citizens who have 
a temporary disagreem ent?
30 John Peters, “Political Theory, Political Science, and The Preface,” 172.
31 Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, 51.
Dahl turns his focus to the question of whether M adison’s system protects 
intense minorities. He suggests that this job will typically fall to the Supreme Court. 
In an empirical study o f Supreme Court cases in which the court reversed legislative 
action, Dahl draws a few conclusions. He notes that in about two-thirds of the cases 
in which the Supreme Court found laws unconstitutional, the majority must have been 
apathetic because no further action was taken to re-enact the law via other strategies. 
However, he questions him self as to how accurate a measuring stick such a study is. 
Just because the Supreme Court strikes a law down, thus favoring the minority, does 
that necessarily mean that the m inority was an intense minority. In other words, is a 
Supreme Court action an indicator o f the intensity of minorities or an indicator o f the 
apathy of majorities? Second, in the remaining one-third of the cases found 
unconstitutional, the judicial veto was overcome by other means, in one case, civil 
war. But even in these cases, the court was successful in delaying many policies 
advocated by a majority but intensely opposed by a minority.32 Dahl concludes that 
intense minorities are protected in democratic nations that em ploy judicial review.
Dahl focuses on intensity because he seeks to understand why democratic 
institutions have succeeded in some nations and failed in others. W hy is it that most 
W estern European nations along with the United States can endure with democratic 
systems and other nations, with equally well written constitutions, fail to endure? His 
answer to this question will lead Dahl to develop the theory of Polyarchy, the model 
o f democracy most associated with Dahl.
■ See Lochner and Slaughterhouse cases.
It is clear that Dahl is uncom fortable with the term democracy. In most 
instances, he qualifies the term when he does use it. He notes, “the term democracy 
is like an ancient kitchen mitten packed with assorted leftovers from twenty-five 
hundred years o f nearly continual usage.”33 To Dahl, democracy has two 
interpretations. Democracy as an ideal and dem ocracy as it actually exists in the real 
world. The ideal dem ocracy would include perfect equality in voting, equal 
opportunities for all citizens to participate and affect the process, “perfect 
understanding” or inform ation about all issues, exact control o f the political agenda 
and com plete inclusion o f all adult citizens.34 However. Dahl understands that in the 
real world such expectations are almost im possible, and completely impossible in 
nations o f considerable size. Therefore, Dahl sees democracy as a spectrum ranging 
from existing nations with democratic aspects to the ideal of perfect democracy. 
Polyarchy represents what Dahl sees as the predom inant form o f dem ocracy in the 
world today. Thus, inherent in the term  polyarchy is the assumption that nations need 
to become more democratic. Polyarchy is only a description of a democratic nation 
that could develop into a nation closer to ideal dem ocracy.35
D ahl’s first three requirements for polyarchy to exist are that people must 
have the right to vote, all votes must be given equal weight and that the option with 
the most votes be enacted into governm ent policy.36 In order to separate polyarchy
Dahl, “Justifying D em ocracy”, 5.
34 Dahl, A Preface to D em ocratic Theory, 71.
35 Ibid., 74.
36 Robert Dahl, D ilemmas in a Pluralist Democracy, 36.
from a totalitarian government which also allows citizens to vote (although with 
extremely limited options), Dahl insists that in a polyarchy citizens must have the 
ability to insert options into the schedule of options. In other words, if option A and 
option B are not acceptable, the citizen may insert option C. Next, all voters must 
have equal inform ation about all the options. Dahl concedes this is unrealistic, but as 
a concept it m ust be promoted as much as possible. Dahl, in later works, will refer to 
fundamental rights necessary for democracies to function, such as freedom of press
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and speech. By protecting these fundamental rights, there is a greater likelihood of 
equal information.
W hat separates polyarchy from a more ideal form o f democracy is the
periodic nature o f elections. Dahl asserts that it is im possible to be completely
democratic when decisions are made every day and elections only take place every
two to four years. Therefore, in a polyarchy, the decisions of the electorate must be
carried out during the “interelection stage.” Dahl argues this will occur only if
representatives feel they are subject to punishment by the voters if they fail to carry
out the electorates’ will.
Dahl somewhat com plicates his theory o f polyarchy by also referring to
interest groups within a polyarchy as “polyarchies.” He states,
Polyarchies include a variety o f organizations which W estern political 
scientists would ordinarily call democratic, including certain aspects of the 
governments of nation states such as the United States and Great Britain; 
states and provinces; numerous cities and towns; some trade-union; numerous
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At this point, it should be noted that polyarchy does not appear to be much 
different than M adisonian democracy. Other than increasing support for 
majoritariansim, polyarchy seems not to be a radical departure from factionalism.
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associations such as Parent-Teacher Associations, chapters of the League
of W om en voters and religious groups. Thus it follows that the number of
■)o
polyarchies is large.'
He also asserts that while independent organizations are not sufficient to produce 
polyarchy, they are a necessary element of a large-scale democratic nation. In fact, 
he argues that autonom ous organizations are both a prerequisite and a consequence of 
polyarchy.39
Dahl also describes the conditions necessary for polyarchies to develop. It is 
at this stage o f his theory that he begins to diverge from M adison. Dahl insists that 
polyarchy will only develop in societies where there already exists a consensus of 
norms. He argues that M adison and others took for granted that most people in the 
United States at the time the Constitution was ratified had relatively similar views on 
natural rights, human nature and social norms. Dahl states, “I believe, [the consensus 
o f norms] hindered realistic and precise thinking about the requirements of 
dem ocracy.”40 In other words, majority tyranny never developed in the United States 
because most people had similar values about most issues. It was not a result of 
M adison’s elaborate system o f minority protections. Dahl feels the Civil W ar proves 
his point. During the Civil W ar there was a fundamental and uncompromising 
disagreement over values in the United States, and the M adisonian system failed to 
produce a solution.
i o
Robert Dahl, A  Preface to Democratic Theory, 74.
39 John M anely, “Neo Pluralism: A Class Analysis o f Pluralism I and 
Pluralism  II” American Political Science Review (Fall 1983): 369.
40 Ibid., 369.
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Polyarchy has a variety of meanings for Dahl. In one respect, polyarchy is a
set of institutions which fosters a relatively dem ocratic political system. Dahl, in his
concern for being empirical, wants to be able to identify tangible institutions (as listed
above). Therefore, by examining a political system he can empirically determine if
that system qualifies for polyarchal status.
Polyarchy is also an environment. Dahl argues that polyarchy can only exist
in a homogeneous political environment. As the severity and intensity of
disagreements increases in a polyarchy, thus creating the possibility o f a permanent
and dissatisfied minority, polyarchy becomes less likely. By creating a multiple
definition o f polyarchy, Dahl wants polyarchy to become both an ends and a means.
Polyarchy needs to create institutions to carry out a democratic process, but at the
same time, needs to create an environment that fosters similar values.
Finally, polyarchy is an evolutionary process. Dahl feels that polyarchy is one
step in the process o f democratization. Polyarchies foster a democratic environm ent
on the political level. However, Dahl hopes that in such an environm ent the political
process will evolve into a more “purely” democratic system. Such a process would
allow for the dem ocratization of economic firms.
Because polyarchy, as an environment, postulates a consensus of norms, Dahl
contends that the checks and balances system o f the United States Constitution also
does nothing to prevent tyranny of the majority. He states,
M adison’s com prom ise between the pow er of majorities and the pow er of 
m inorities rested in large part, upon the existence of constitutional checks 
upon majority action. As distinguished from  M adisonianism, the theory of 
polyarchy focuses primarily not on the constitutional prerequisites but on 
the social prerequisites for a democratic order.
Dahl contends that as nations become more heterogeneous, with respect to values, 
there is less likelihood that stable democracies will develop. Or. as nations become 
more heterogeneous, independent groups will have more autonomy within society.
At this point, one can see why Dahl was not w illing to com pletely rule out the process 
of federalism or m inority rule in certain instances. It also becomes clear as to why 
Dahl was concerned w ith the concept of intensity. As passionate cleavages develop 
in democracies, the less likely they are to survive. “In a sense,” Dahl concludes in A 
Preface to D em ocratic Theory, “what we ordinarily describe as democratic politics is 
merely the chaff. It is the surface manifestation, representing superficial conflicts.”41 
In other words, that the reason American dem ocracy has survived is because o f a lack 
o f intense disagreem ents, not because o f checks and balances or minority vetoes.
The theory o f  polyarchy sets up a very narrow spectrum in which M adison’s 
view of factionalism  and D ahl’s view o f polyarchy can co-exist. Madison argues that 
a variety of independent interests (factions) with divergently different goals must 
continually com pete w ith one another to prevent tyranny o f the majority. Dahl 
counters that the divergently different goals must not be too divergent or else 
polyarchy will not develop. In essence, polyarchy is a function of consensus. 
However, Dahl accepts M adison’s contention that pluralism  is necessary for 
democracies to exist on a large geographic scale. Therefore, in order for both theories 
to be compatible, interest groups must compete and disagree with each other, but at 
the same time there must be underlying values that all interest groups hold as true, 
regardless o f their “superficial” disagreements.
41 Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, 124.
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Up to this point, two aspects o f Dahl’s political theories have been discussed. 
First, Dahl believes that societies can and should becom e more democratic. Second, 
polyarchy does not describe an ideal democracy. It describes a stage in democratic 
development. W ithin that second concept is the im plication that polyarchies need to 
undergo some form o f transition that will bring about a more democratic society.
Dahl additionally feels that unequal distribution o f wealth is the primary 
im pedim ent to a fully dem ocratic society. In the 1950s, Dahl along with his most 
frequent collaborator, Charles Lindblom, revised the theory of pluralism .42 They 
argued that pluralism  best described “power relationships” within the United States 
and most polyarchies. The basic tenets of pluralism were 1) power was tamed and 
coercion minimized; 2) the consent o f all citizens was promoted; 3) the system forced 
peaceful settlem ents o f all contending parties; and 4) the political system was open to 
most interests if the interests felt strongly enough to mobilize pressure.43 However, 
the performance o f the political economy in the United States from the 1950s to the 
1980s so concerned Dahl and Lindblom, in that the gap between the righ and poor 
was ever widening, that they began to revise their theory o f pluralism. They began to 
insist that wealth must be redistributed in order for polyarchies to survive, at worst, or 
to transform into more democratic societies, at best.
D ahl’s revision of pluralism is initiated by his separation o f capitalism from 
polyarchy.44 Historically, the two had always been tied together. In their jo int effort
42 Ibid., 372.
43 John M anely, “Neo Pluralism: A Class Analysis of Pluralism I and
Pluralism II” , 391.
44 Ibid., 391.
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in 1953, Politics Econom ics and Welfare, Dahl and Lindblom assert a variety of
arguments, all o f which suggest limiting the private control o f capital, limiting the
influence o f business in politics and redistributing wealth more equally.
In the realm  o f attitudes and ideology, we Americans have an irrational 
com m itm ent to private ownership and control o f economic enterprises 
that prevents us from thinking clearly about econom ic arrangements, 
private ownership and control is but one form among a vast variety of 
options.45 
They continue,
To dem ocratize the American polyarchy further will require a redistribution 
of w ealth and income. It follows from all we have said that we believe that 
major structural reforms are required in the American politico-economic 
system. 46
Dahl is not calling for a redistribution of wealth strictly on grounds of social justice.
Dahl is first and forem ost a student o f democratic theory. He views inequality of
wealth as a disturbance to democratic systems.
Pluralism is based on the idea of competition among groups, interests and the
varying elites. However, economic power distorts the ability of all groups to compete
fairly. This is D ahl’s major concern.
Businessmen play a distinctive role in polyarchal politics that is 
quantitatively different from that of any interest group. It is also much 
more powerful than any other interest group. Common interpretations 
that depict the American or any other market-oriented system as a 
competition am ong interest groups are seriously in error for their 
failure to take account of the distinctive privileged position of 
businessmen in politics.47
If the competition in the political marketplace is not fair, then groups in power will
remain in power. Interests that are already wealthy will stay wealthy. This is what
45 Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom. Politics, Economics and Welfare, 111.
46 Ibid., xx x v ii .
Dahl refers to as stabilizing inequality. However, he is not strictly speaking about
economic inequality. He also means political inequality,
An evident feature o f the consensus prevailing in all polyarchies is that 
it endorses attitudes, values, and policies of more benefit to the already 
favored groups in the society than to the less favored. Because 
governments respond more to the better-off than the worse-off. they 
help to sustain the cycles of political effectiveness and ineffectuality 
that in turn perpetuate the structural inequalities.48
Dahl therefore concludes that pluralism, in the traditional sense, has not achieved the
goals that he once hoped dem ocracy would achieve. First, Dahl had hoped that
polyarchies, in terms o f process, would eventually transform  into more democratic
states. Second, in terms o f an ends, he hoped polyarchies would distribute wealth
more evenly. However, the opposite is occurring.
In Democracy, Liberty and Equality  and A Preface to Economic Democracy
Dahl continues to focus on the theoretical aspects of economic equality. Dahl finds
him self confronted with the same dilemmas as M adison and DeTocquville; equality
and liberty are not always com patible forces. In fact, in many cases, liberty is
antagonistic to equality. Dahl is confronted with the paradox. He feels that
democratization of our society must increase. He also argues that democratization
cannot increase unless there is a more equal distribution of econom ic resources.
However, in order to equalize wealth, society usually must limit liberty. Dahl poses
the question, “can we create econom ic equality with out destroying political liberty?
Or, is there an unavoidable trade-off between the tw o?”
Dahl begins his analysis by re-exam ining DeTocquville's assertion that
democracy can be dangerous to property rights. In essence, DeTocquville repeats
47 Robert Dahl, A Preface to Economic Democracy, 143.
52
M adison’s fears that a majority of lower-class citizens can dem ocratically initiate an 
egalitarian revolution 49 W hat prevents this from happening, Dahl argues, is that 
property rights are viewed as a fundamental right and are, therefore, beyond the 
jurisdiction of majority rule. He argues that “Americans capitalism  rests ultimately 
on an inalienable right o f [property]” He continues, “American beliefs about 
inalienable rights to life, liberty, and -  the last of the constitutional trio— property” 50 
are preventing the further development of democracy.
D ahl’s solution is to assert that dem ocracy itself is a fundamental right. In 
essence, he seeks to make the right to “democratic control” superior to the right to 
private property. “W hat my argument does is to establish a claim  to dem ocracy as a 
m atter o f  right in any [D ahl’s italics] association o f any kind.”51 Dahl is not only 
asserting that the right to majority rule is superior to the right o f private property, he 
is also asserting that any organization, which meets certain criteria, should be 
dem ocratically governed. Such an argument allows for the next logical step. If 
political associations should be dem ocratically governed, then as a m atter o f course, 
economic firms should be dem ocratically governed.
One o f D ahl’s concerns is that economic firms are inherently dictatorial in the 
way they function, i.e. workers have little to no impact on how decisions are made 
within the firm. Furthermore, Americans accept this as the proper arrangement for
48 Ibid., 145.
49 Alex DeTocquville, D emocracy in Am erica  (Boston: Penguin Books, 1961),
298.
50 Robert Dahl, A Preface to Economic Democracy, 56.
51 Ibid.,61.
economic associations.1’2 If all economic firms are allowed to remain undemocratic in
the way they function, polyarchies will never make the leap to a more democratic
society. He argues,
But I do not see how private ownership of corporate enterprise can be a 
fundamental moral right. To reach such a conclusion requires jum ping a 
series of logical hurdles. Even if  we were to assume that everyone has 
a fundamental right to economic liberty, it would not follow that 
everyone has a fundamental right to private property. To assert that 
private property is a natural right is to say close to nothing at all.33
Dahl follows up this argum ent with the conclusion that if  dem ocracy is an acceptable
process for governing the state, then it must also be justified in governing economic
enterprises.54 Conversely, if dem ocracy is not acceptable for governing the economic
firm then it must not be good enough to govern the state.
Dahl attempts to avoid the socialist label. Despite support for progressive tax
policies, strong union power, and an involved welfare state, he does not support
“direct redistribution.” On a practical level, Dahl does not believe Americans can
make the mental shift to “distributive justice” after so long an historical experience to
the contrary. Second, he feels such changes are unlikely “in an American system
where intense minorities are pow erful.”55 However, he is willing to promote
democratic control o f corporate capitalism  in the name o f substantive equality in
order to control the ill effects o f capitalism on individual liberty. In doing so, he
hopes that democracy can spread to all aspects o f human organization. In some ways,
52 Ibid., 55.
53 Ibid., 74.
54Ibid., 111.
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Dahl sounds like a m odem  day M adison. Just as M adison did not want to eliminate 
liberty as a method of elim inating factions. Dahl does not want to eliminate 
capitalism  as a method for elim inating inequalities in wealth. M adison tried to 
control the effects o f faction within a free society as Dahl tries to control the effects 
o f inequality within a capitalist society. Dahl criticizes M adison by questioning 
w hether a system that so stringently protects minorities is still democratic. However, 
one could question w hether a system in which private property is no longer a 
fundamental right is still capitalistic.
AREAS OF AGREEEMENT BETWEEN DAHL AND MADISON
Despite the fact that Dahl is considered by many to be a critic o f Madison, 
both men hold similar views on many significant issues concerning democratic 
theory. In fact, Dahl and M adison were more alike than different. Dahl sets out to 
construct a model to explain how democracies actually function. In doing so, he finds 
that Madison failed to understand several aspects of dem ocratic systems. Madison, 
Dahl claims, focused too much on the possibility of tyranny o f the majority, granted 
an inordinate amount o f pow er to minorities and thus created a system that was only 
marginally democratic. Furtherm ore, Dahl argues that M adison did not understand 
the social conditions necessary for democracy to flourish. As a result, Dahl feels that 
M adison put too much faith in structural methods to prevent tyranny of the majority 
and minority and ignored the fact that social homogeneity was a prim ary requirement 
for democracy.
55 Ibid., 163.
However, even if one accepts all of D ahl’s criticism s o f M adison, it is 
impossible to ignore the fact that pluralism, as defined by Dahl, is not radically 
different than factionalism as described by M adison. In the same vein, M adison may 
not have advocated that dem ocracy should or will pervade all aspects of society, but it 
is not accurate to label him an anti-democrat. A close reading o f M adison’s notes at 
the Federal Convention, along with letters he wrote to fellow leaders demonstrates he 
was a strong advocate o f democracy. Finally, the fact that M adison and Dahl both 
focus on similar difficulties with democratic theory suggests that they were looking at 
democracy through a similar lens. Both theorists were concerned with small groups. 
M adison tried to protect small groups and individuals from factions, especially to 
protect their individual liberties. Dahl tried to protect society from small groups with 
inordinate amounts o f power. In their separate ways, they both w anted to account for 
intense minorities within a greater system. As a result, they were both concerned with 
the concept o f size and struggled with the prospect o f extending democracy to a large 
and diverse society.
Dahl states that pluralist democracies face a constant contradiction. On one 
hand, individual groups must have autonomy or liberty. At the same time, groups 
must be controlled in order to prevent them from doing harm to themselves or 
society. According to Dahl, “autonomous organizations” exist if  organizations can 
“undertake actions that 1) are considered harmful by other organizations and that 2) 
no other organization can prevent the [other] actor from doing so.” And if groups are 
autonomous, “ the problem o f democratic pluralism is serious precisely because 
independent organizations are highly desirable and at the same time their
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independence allows them to do harm.”56 The words may be different, but the 
arguments and definitions are the same as those presented in Federalist #  10.
M adison also worries about autonomous groups tendencies to sacrifice the public 
good for their own benefit, but he calls these groups factions. And, like Dahl, 
M adison argues that despite the possible danger factions pose, they must be allowed 
to exist and to flourish.
However, when competition between factions begins to deteriorate the 
consensus o f values a political system maintains, Dahl contends that stable polyarchy 
is threatened. In such a case, Dahl typically recommends consociational forms of 
democracy as a solution. He argues that where a collection of diverse minorities all 
occupy the same geographic location and are all ruled by the same government, some 
type o f corporate system becomes necessary to prevent tyranny o f the minority or 
political gridlock. However, to argue that each sub-system or significant interest in 
the consensus model has the power to veto collective decisions is not much different 
than M adison’s provisions for minority vetoes to prevent tyranny of the majority; 
provisions o f which Dahl is very critical.
Again, if  one looks at D ahl’s arguments about “corporate capitalism ,” he 
appears to agree with M adison more than he disagrees. Dahl argues that since the 
development o f corporate capitalism, economic wealth is now equitable with political 
power. He goes on to suggest that since M adison and most of the other Founders did 
not foresee a change in American society from agrarian to industrial, they did not 
foresee the destruction o f political equality. However, there is evidence to suggest 
that M adison was concerned about the effects o f property on voting equality. On July
56 Robert Dahl, Ddilemmas in a Pluralist Demoicracy. 1 ‘63.
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26, M adison moved to strike the word “landed” before the word “qualifications" in 
the passage concerning suffrage rights in the Constitution. He argues, “unjust laws o f 
the States had proceeded from this class o f [landed] men than any other. It was 
politics as well as justice that the interests of every class should be duly represented 
and understood in the councils.”57 In all, M adison was a democrat. As a college 
student during initial stages o f the Revolutionary W ar, he, like most college students, 
developed radical (at the time) views about democracy. However, many of those 
views were eventually tem pered by his experience as a delegate to the Continental 
Congress during the darker times of the war. It might be more accurate to suggest 
that M adison was an advocate o f slow and moderate democracy, not an anti­
democrat.
In developing his theory of polyarchy, Dahl presents the idea that what
separates M adisonian thinking from his own is the concept of social checks on
tyranny o f the majority. Dahl feels that M adison placed too much faith in structural
and institutional checks as a means for preventing majority and minority tyranny.
Dahl feels that, in the end, a homogeneous culture is the only true means of
preventing tyranny, However, in a letter to Jefferson in 1788, M adison provides
some evidence that he might agree with Dahl:
Repeated violations o f these parchm ent barriers have been com mitted by 
overbearing majorities in every state. In Virginia I have seen the bill of rights 
violated in every instance where it has been opposed to a popular current. 
Notwithstanding the explicit provision contained in that instrument for the 
rights of conscience, it is well known that a religious establishment would 
have taken place in that state if the legislative majority had found a majority 
o f the people in favor o f the measure. W herever the real power of the 
government lies, there is the danger o f oppression. In our governments the real 
pow er lies in the majority of the com m unity, and the invasion of private rights
57 James Madison, The journa l o f  the Federal Convention, 119.
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is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts o f government contrary to the
sense o f its constituents, but from acts in which the government is the mere
58instrument of the major number of the constituents.'
C O N C L U SIO N S
Having exam ined the works and philosophies of both theorists, are there any 
general conclusions one can draw in comparing M adison and Dahl? Madison had a 
pressing job to do: draft a new constitution w ith a stronger national government. 
D ahl’s intention is to create a theoretical model that, hopefully, will make an 
intellectual contribution to democratic theory. M adison had to be much more 
concerned with practical and realistic aspects of creating a government from scratch. 
He had spent a considerable amount o f time studying old systems o f government in 
order to discern the strengths and weaknesses o f each. W hen M adison attended the 
Constitutional convention, he inherited a diverse nation, with pre-existing prejudices 
left over from the Revolution. M adison’s audiance had an expectation for popular 
sovereignty and dem anded that certain “natural rights” be protected. They also had 
loyalties to pre-existing state governments. He was forced to accept compromises 
and adapt to the environm ent in which he >vas working. As the nation he help create 
grew and faced unforeseen challenges, M adison was forced to amend his political 
views with what he thought would be politically successful and institutionally 
healthy.
Dahl, on the other hand, is working in a more intellectual arena. He is 
allowed to indulge in purely normative questions. He has the freedom to envision an 
“ideal dem ocracy” and argue the m erits o f such a system. He is not constrained by
58 Smith, Peter. A Republic o f  Letters, pg. 503.
any knowledge that he might have to actually create his ideal system. He, from time 
to time, will offer suggestions to improve M adison’s system, but he is never called 
upon to draft a national charter. As a result, Dahl has the luxury o f being able to call 
for democratic socialism w ith-out having to provide the same level of specifics that 
M adison was forced to provide in the Virginia Plan. M adison was not able to call for 
minority protections, on a theoretical basis, and then leave the details up to others. In 
an ironic twist, it is Dahl whose accuses M adison of not being practical. Dahl argues 
that it was M adison who relied too much on vague notions of “natural rights” and 
“tyranny.” However, many critics o f Dahl suggest he suffers from the same malady. 
W hen Dahl is trying to be empirical, in many ways he is simply referring to other 
theorists. “His em pirical world, however” as Lucian Pye writes, “is largely o f the 
realities described by the literature of Plato, Aristotle, Pareto, M orasca and other 
numerous w orthies.”39 “Considering how closely the author [Dahl] is identified with 
behaviorlism ,” Jack Nagel (1991) adds, “one is struck by how much o f Democracy  
and its Critics reads like the work o f a philosopher.”60
A second conclusion one could draw about the two theorists is that M adison 
was a democrat who em phasized the limitations o f democracy and Dahl was the 
democrat who em phasized the potential o f democracy. It could be argued that 
M adison was trying to construct a democratic system into something that was 
practical and lasting, while Dahl was trying to reconstruct this democratic system so 
as to eliminate many o f  the roadblocks M adison had created. Madison appears more 
aware than Dahl o f the frailties and vices of people. He develops his plan for a
59 Luciano Pye, “Review of Democracy and Its Critic,” 628.
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democratic republic with this darker image of man prominent in his mind. His 
analysis o f factions suggest that one o f the most dangerous entities a people will face 
in a democratic system is the people themselves. Like other Federalists, M adison 
seeks to protect the people from themselves.
Dahl seeks to expand dem ocracy to a new level o f inclusion. Dahl professes 
as his goal “to close the gap between polyarchy and dem ocracy." Dahl views the 
development o f dem ocracy in an evolutionary prospective. According to Dahl, 
democracy was born in the Greek city-states and has slowly been evolving into 
something bigger and better. However, he assumes that dem ocracy has not finished 
growing. He envisions a “third transform ation” that will allow democracy to spread 
to the world o f economic associations. Some critics have suggested that D ahl’s use 
o f the term polyarchy allows him to reserve the term ‘dem ocracy’ for normative use 
as a set o f unrealized goals. In this way, M adison and Dahl can be compared, in a 
normative and empirical sense, with respect to the extent democracy should pervade a 
political and economic systems.
This contention leads to a third conclusion that can be draw about the two 
theorists. M adison seeks to place fundamental rights on a “higher plane” than the 
democratic decision-making process. That is, he believes that certain rights are 
inherent or “natural rights,” and even fundamental to the survival o f democracy and 
therefore not subject to majority rule. This argument becomes most clear in the 
debate over property rights. It would probably be fair to say that M adison felt that the 
right to property was superior to m ajority rule. Therefore, he would probably argue 
that m ajority rule should not be able to deprive a citizen o f his control of economic
60 Jack Nagle, “Review Sym posium ,” 218.
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resources. However, Dahl would contend that a right of the people to democratically 
control all aspects o f their environment, including their economic environment, is a 
fundamental right which takes precedent over an individual’s property rights.
Dahl m ust create this hierarchy o f rights in order to justify his call for 
dem ocratizing econom ic firms. He must reconcile the age old tension between liberty 
and equality. To accomplish this task, he must elevate the egalitarian aspects of 
majority rule above the right to private property. By doing so, he can advocate forms 
of democratic socialism with out violating “fundam ental rights.”
This difference o f opinion possibly springs from the fact that M adison was 
writing and developing his ideas about governm ent before the industrial revolution 
affected American society. He lived in an agrarian world that prevented large scale 
class inequalities. Furthermore, he lived in a country with what seemed to be an 
expansive W estern frontier. These circumstances led M adison, and others o f his 
time, to believe that regional and economic issues would be an aspect of the 
governmental policy making process, but not necessarily the dominant aspect. Dahl 
is probably correct when he argues that the Founders did not foresee the extent to 
which economics would play a role in the political process, especially after 
industrialization.
Dahl views the world from a different century. He feels economic inequality 
is rampant and econom ic power is political power. His view o f who holds the power 
is com pletely reversed. He sees small m inorities, such as corporations and business 
classes with inordinent econom ic power, oppressing the majority. As a result, 
M adison spends most o f his efforts trying to protect minority factions and Dahl
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spends considerable effort trying to justify majority rule to protect majority factions 
from econom ically powerful minority factions.
Dahl is struck by the numerous paradoxes that large republics create. He 
notes that there are incessant tradeoffs between desirable goals in large democracies.
A short list includes the tradeoffs between unity and diversity, the common interest 
and individual interests, and the control and the autonomy of elected officials. Dahl 
condenses all o f these contradictions into two concepts; citizen effectiveness and 
capacity of the system. Or, the more power individual citizens have, the less functions 
a government can serve. He argues that as a system becomes larger, citizens lose the 
ability to affect the political system to be responsive to their desires. And yet, as the 
political system becom es stronger, the system acquires the ability to deal with larger 
issues that are im portant to the populace. In other words, as Lincoln pointed out 100 
years before Dahl in his Gettysburg Address, citizens are offered either control of an 
impotent state, or little control of a powerful state.
Dahl refers to the above dilemma as the “problem  of the democratic unit.” He 
argues that one lim itation of democratic theory is that the democratic process assumes 
that a boundary in which the democratic process will take place already exists. 
However, the tension between citizen control and political effectiveness that Lincoln 
and Dahl highlight suggest that multiple boundaries are necessary. Small boundaries 
to ensure citizen effectiveness and a large boundary to ensure political effectiveness. 
M adison’s solution was to codify the rules of federalism in the Constitution.
Although federalism  is the result of historical developm ent as much as M adisonian 
planning, M adison did entrench federalism into our national system. Federalism
allows citizens to be close to local governments and thus allows for ‘citizen 
effectiveness,’ while, at the same time, citizens are distant from the large national 
government which m aintains its 'system  capacity.’ M adison also suggested that by 
“enlarging the sphere” o f government via the republican principle, representatives 
would remain responsive to the people, while, at the same time, Senators would be 
elected from a larger geographic area and thus maintain some autonomy.
Again, the issue eventually revolves around the concept o f ‘intensity.’ Both 
Dahl and M adison understand that intense minorities dem and action and in some 
cases deserve responsiveness. However, they also were aware of the fact there is no 
relationship between the size o f a group or faction and the likelihood that the goals o f 
the group will be in the “general interests” of the country.
CHAPTER 4
“Discrim inating Between Economic and Political R ights'’
Both Robert Dahl and James M adison were concerned with the issue o f rights. 
They w anted to create political systems that were democratic, but at the same time, 
they wanted to create systems that would protect individual rights, group rights, rights 
of the majority and rights of the minority. However, for both theorists the term 
“rights” is only vaguely defined. This is a short-coming of their political theories. In 
order to com pletely understand how democratic institutions protect, or fail to protect, 
rights, one m ust have a clearer definition of “rights” than the definition provided by 
either Dahl or M adison.
Put in its m ost simplistic terms, all rights, either allocated or enforced by 
governments, can be sub-divided into political rights and economic rights. Rights 
must exhibit certain criteria in order to fall into either category. This is not to say that 
all rights will fall neatly into one of those two categories. It may be more helpful to 
assume a spectrum  ranging from purely political rights to purely econom ic rights. It 
is entirely possible that many rights would exhibit criteria o f both categories. 
However, this does not preclude us from determining if a right is “more political” 
than economic, or vice versa.
The im portant question, at this point, is what criteria will be used to determine 
if a right is political or economic? In order to answ er this question I propose to use an 
economic theory. In the late 1950s and early 1960s economists developed a field of 
thought known as collective action theory.1 Collective action theory divided
1 M ancur Olson. The Logic o f  Collective Action  (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1970), 99.
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economic goods into two categories. The theory held that goods are either “public 
goods” or “private goods.” However, as was noted above, ju st as the dichotomy 
between political rights and economic rights is not absolute, economists also noted 
that goods would fall into a spectrum ranging from purely public to purely private. 
Economists developed certain criteria to determine if  a good was public or private. I 
plan to use the same criteria economists use for econom ic goods, but superimposed 
upon “political goods.” Therefore, it will be argued that “political rights” exhibit the 
same criteria as public goods and “economic rights” exhibit the same criteria as 
private goods. W hat those exact criteria are will be developed in a subsequent section 
o f this thesis.
The next logical question, at this point, is, what purpose is served by sub­
dividing rights into two categories? Returning to collective action theory, econom ists 
noted that individuals react differently to incentive structures created by public goods 
than to incentive structures created by private goods. They noted that people have an 
incentive to pay for private goods, but that they have a disincentive to pay for public 
goods. Thus, by sub-dividing goods into two categories, economists are better able to 
understand how the economic marketplace functioned.
W hat if  the same logic could be applied to the “political m arketplace” ? If it 
could be dem onstrated that people react differently towards government “allocated” 
economic rights as opposed to political rights, such an understanding might help 
explain the dem ocratic process. In other words, it might be possible to argue that 
economic rights elicit from individuals different incentive structures than do political 
rights. It will be argued that political rights, like public goods, create a disincentive to
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participate in the political system. Just as public goods create a disincentive to pay, 
political rights create a disincentive to participate. In contrast, economic rights, like 
private goods, create a strong incentive to participate.
By using collective action theory to provide further insight into how people 
react in a political system  w ith respect to the allocation of economic and political 
rights, one might be able to unlock one of the most puzzling aspects of democratic 
theory. Both M adison and Dahl were concerned about how intensity of interest or 
intensity o f participation would affect the democratic process. M adison never tried to 
quantify intensity. He did, however, understand its effects on democratic systems.
He relied on federalism to make systems responsive to intensity, but also hopefully, 
to prevent the adverse effects intensity might cause. Dahl wanted to develop a system 
to empirically measure intensity. However, in the end, he concluded that it was too 
abstract a concept to m easure.2 He was forced to admit that polyarchy would only 
work if intense conflicts were avoided, or, barring that possibility, he advocated a 
variety o f coporatist and consociational democratic structures to deal with the 
problem of intensity. However, if  the use of collective action theory can provide an 
insight into the causes o f intensity, democratic theorists might better be able to 
account for intensity.
It is also im portant to clarify any value-laden judgem ents about intensity. 
M adison and Dahl did not view all “ intense efforts” as detrimental to the political 
process. It is very possible for an intense effort to be positive. However, they were 
aware that intensity needed to be understood if  dem ocracy was to be understood as a
2 Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, 101.
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real process, not a hypothetical process. Furthermore, in certain circumstances and 
with certain issues, both theorists understood that intensity could be hazardous to the 
political process. Dahl felt intense minorities could tyrannize apathetic majorities or 
other minorities, while M adison felt intense minorities needed constitutional and 
structural protections.
CO LLECTIV E ACTION THEORY
The most im portant criteria that separates political rights from economic 
rights is rivalry. Political rights have the characteristic o f non-rivalry while economic 
rights have a strong tendency towards rivalry. This occurs because political rights are 
typically granted or enforced on an infinite level; i.e., there is an unlimited supply of 
m ost political rights. On the contrary, economic rights must be rationed because they 
are a finite resource. In order to better understand this concept, a more comprehensive 
understanding o f collective action theory is needed. Specifically, one needs to 
understand the criteria econom ists used to separate public goods from private goods. 
This is necessary because the same criteria will be used to differentiate between 
political rights and econom ic rights. The criteria used to differentiate public goods 
from private goods revolves around three concepts. The concepts are non-rivalry, 
non-excludability and non-divisibility.
Non-rivalry describes how collective goods or public goods do not inspire 
competition. The reason is, in a hypothetical sense, a public good has an infinite 
supply. Economists argue that com petition for resources occurs because all resources
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are finite. Therefore, both the farmer and the rancher compete for land because they 
both need the land and it is finite in supply. However, public goods, to some degree, 
offer an infinite supply of a good and therefore, there is no need for competition.
A good example o f a purely public good is a lighthouse. The lighthouse 
produces light and light is considered a non-rivalry good. Simply put, a captain 
aboard a ship can look at the light from the lighthouse for as long as he wants. His 
actions will do nothing to decrease the amount o f light available to other captains. In 
other words, the light can not be “used up.” In a more technical sense, M ancur Olson 
writes, “jointness of supply [non-rivalry] accounts for the fact that additional 
members can enjoy a good with little or no reduction in the consumption of the old 
m em bers.”3
One might note that Olson did not speak in absolutes. For instance, a road is 
also considered a public good. In an ideal world, roads would exhibit the 
characteristic o f non-rivalry. O f course roads do not get “used up” when someone 
drives on it. There is still ju st as much road left for the next person. However, roads 
are not purely public as the use of the road by one person can decrease the use o f the 
road by another person. Anyone who has been involved in a traffic jam  knows this is 
true. However, in a general sense, the publics use o f public goods does create a zero- 
sum  situation. By definition, the benefits o f a public good increases as the number of 
people who seek to use the public good increases.4 Or, put another way, if  one person
3 M ancur Olson, The Logic o f  Collective Action, 14.
4 Ibid., 28.
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uses a road, then one “unit”5 of the road is provided. If two people use the road, then 
two “units” o f equal amount are provided. However, if two people seek to use the 
same acre o f land, then smaller “units” must be provided to account for the rivalry for 
the good.
The second criteria for a public good is non-excludability. Non-excludability 
is the condition that once a public good is created, regardless o f the means, no one 
can be prevented from using the public good. This characteristic makes public goods 
very different from private goods. W ith a private good, the ow ner o f the good can 
ration access to the good. A collective or public good is here defined as any good 
such that, if any person in a group of persons consumes it, it cannot feasibly be 
withheld from others in that group. In other words, those who do not purchase or pay 
for any o f the public good cannot be excluded or kept from sharing in the 
consumption of the good, as in the case o f non-collective goods. This characteristic 
of public goods is significant in affecting the incentive structure people face when 
trying to produce or allocate collective goods.
Garrett Hardin, in his famous “The Tragedy of the Com m ons,” discussed such 
an incentive structure. He noted that any time a community had a common area in 
which to graze livestock, that common area was eventually destroyed by overuse. He 
observed that people would much rather use the public com mons than their own land. 
Since the lot was public, and therefore non-excludible, anyone could use the land at
5 “Unit” in this case is an am biguous term at best. It refers to the fact that an 
individual, by using the road, has realized some utility by doing so. However, it is 
difficult for econom ists to develop concrete measurements for public goods because 
they are indivisible.
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no apparent cost to himself. In essence, there was an incentive structure to use the 
land at a rate far higher than if  one was required to pay for the use o f the land.
Returning to the lighthouse example, one can note the realistic applications of 
non-excludability. Assume that the lighthouse tried to ration the use o f its product by 
selling perm its to use the light. This would be ineffective because o f the non­
excludability characteristic of the good. How could the lighthouse prevent the use of 
its good by non-paying individuals? There is no way to direct the light to only those 
ships that have a permit. Furthermore, the owners o f the lighthouse cannot require 
non-paying m em bers to wear blinders.
However, like non-rivalry, the characteristic of non-excludability is not 
absolute. H arvey Rosen notes that a lighthouse could be made excludible if  the right 
technology were made available.6 He argues that in modem times lighthouses tend to 
be electronic and therefore signals could be scrambled for non-payers. Or, in a more 
extreme case, he notes that the lighthouse could be given permission to fire missiles 
at ships using but not buying a permit. He also points out that public goods do not 
have to have both characteristics mentioned above. He cites roads as an exam ple. A 
road may be purely non-excludible, but not necessarily purely non-rival.
The last characteristic o f a public good is non-divisibility. Non-divisibility is 
the characteristic that public goods are allocated in lump sums of all or nothing.
There is no w ay to allocate different percentages o f public goods to different citizens. 
The Italian econom ist Ugo M azzola em phasized what he called the “indivisibility o f
6 H arvey Rosen. Public Finance (Illinois: Irwin, 1988), 64.
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public goods.”7 He noted that once a good was created it went to all people equally. 
That is not to say that it benefited all people equally. For instance, the entire 
community m ay pay for a fire department, but it may benefit the person living in the 
log house m uch m ore than the person living in the glass house.
Returning once more to the lighthouse, it is obvious that ships cannot be 
allocated different am ounts o f light. Either the lighthouse is on or off. It is not 
possible to grant one ship a 40% allocation o f light and another ship only 20% of the 
light. Everyone gets 100% of the light or none o f the light.
Before explaining how public goods have sim ilar characteristics to our 
hypothetical “political goods,” it would be helpful to briefly describe private goods. 
Private goods differ form public goods in that they have none o f the characteristics 
listed above. A private good will have some, if  not all, o f the characteristics of 
rivalry, excludibility and divisibility. For instance, an automobile can be a private 
good. If a person owns a car, he or she can exclude anyone else from using it. A 
better exam ple would be land. Land, in the hands o f private ownership, exhibits all 
the characteristics o f private goods. Like the car, the use o f private property, or 
access to it, m ay be denied. Second, land is obviously a finite resource. Therefore, it 
is a good that exhibits the characteristic o f rivalry. Every acre o f land a farmer uses is 
one acre o f land a rancher or homebuilder cannot use. And last, land is divisible.
Land can be apportioned in varying amounts to different people.
7 M ancur Olson, The Logic o f  Collective Action, 99-100.
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W hat separates private goods from  public goods is the zero-sum gain 
mentality that surrounds private goods.8 W hen a private resource is allocated to a 
specific individual, all other individuals can interpret that allocation as a loss. In fact, 
Lester Thurow, a noted Yale econom ist, refers to the allocation o f economic 
resources as “loss allocation.” He is suggesting that anytime the government, or any 
association allocates a resource that is private in nature, it is also allocating a loss to 
all other segments o f society. This characteristic is going to be important later in the 
discussion o f the hypothetical “econom ic rights.” It will be argued that “economic 
rights” exhibit a zero-sum  gain characteristic while “political rights” do not.
One last definition is required before one can fully understand collective 
action theory. The concept o f the “free rider” is im portant in understanding the 
complexities o f allocating public goods, and therefore “political goods”. A free rider 
is someone who chooses not to contribute to the cost of producing a public good 
because he or she knows that the good will be non-excludable. We can again look to 
the lighthouse for an explanation. Econom ists argue that if  contributions to raise 
money for building a lighthouse were voluntary, not enough money would be 
collected. This would lead to what econom ist refer to as an inefficient amount o f a 
public good.9 The reason for this under allocation is that individuals know that they 
will be allowed to use the lighthouse even if  they did not help pay for it. Thus the 
incentive structure becom es, “let other people pay for it and I will use it.” It is 
im portant to note that, in general, public goods suffer from a free rider problem  but 
private goods do not.
8 Lester Thurow. The Zero-Sum Society  (London: Penguin Books, 1980), 11.
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The concept of the free rider is im portant to this thesis for two reasons. First, 
it will later be argued that “political rights’’ suffer from free riders ju st like public 
goods suffer from  free riders. And, like private goods, “economic rights” do not. 
Second, it allows us to draw a distinction between the economic marketplace and the 
political marketplace. Governments and econom ist have developed a way to avoid 
the free rider problem  in the econom ic marketplace. They use mandatory taxation to 
require everyone to contribute to the construction of public goods. This way the 
burden o f national defense, police and fire protection are bom by all taxpayers. 
However, the political marketplace has no institution to require participation. 
Therefore, it will be argued that “political rights” not only have a free rider problem, 
but that it is im possible to avoid the free rider problem.
The purpose o f superim posing collective action theory, an econom ic model, 
onto a political system is to determine if the “rules” of the economic world apply to 
the political world. Thus, I have introduced the terms economic marketplace and 
“political m arketplace.” In order to draw an effective comparison, a more developed 
definition of “political m arketplace” is needed.
Joseph Schumpeter, in his epic work Capitalism, Socialism and D em ocracy, 
introduced the idea that political systems functioned similarly to economic system s.10 
Schumpeter com pared the political com petition for votes to com petitions within the 
market. Voters acted like consumers in that they choose between policies. The 
policies are analogous to products offered in the marketplace. These products
9 Harvey Rosen, Public Finance, 72.
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(policies) were offered by “political entrepreneurs.” " In other words, politicians act 
like producers and voters act like consumers. Thus, political parties and associations 
regulated the political m arketplace in the same way firms and consumers regulated 
the economic marketplace. Schum peter argues that it is not cynical to abide by the 
philosophy that “W hat businessm en do not understand is that exactly as they are 
dealing in oil so I am dealing in votes.” 12 Put another way, politicians buy and sell 
votes as currency in the same way the businessmen buy and sell oil as currency.
Schumpeter is not alone in this view. Anthony Downs, in his book An 
Economic Theory o f  Democracy, suggests that political parties are just like firms in a 
marketplace. They seek to m axim ize votes just as a firm would try to maximize 
market share or profits. These models are significant in that they offer some 
understanding as to why dem ands for “economic rights” are so intense. Schumpeter 
argues individuals seek to satisfy short-run desires in the econom ic market.
Similarly, politicians and voters seek to do the same thing in the political 
m arketplace.13
All o f the above concepts bring us to the heart o f this thesis. As mentioned at 
the beginning of this chapter, it will be argued that there exist two types of rights.
They are economic rights and political rights.'4 It will be further argued that these
10 Joseph Schumpeter. Capitalism, Socialism and Dem ocracy ( New York: 
Harper Torch Books, 1941), 269.
11 Ibid., 291.
12 Ibid., 292.
13 Ibid., 295.
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rights can be defined by using the criteria economists use to define public and private 
goods. The next logical step is to argue that if political rights are like public goods, 
then they must suffer from a free-rider problem. Thus, one could offer the hypothesis 
that either political goods attract a less intense level o f political participation, or that 
economic rights attract a higher level of political participation.
In order to exam ine w hether political rights act like public goods, it will be 
necessary to investigate if  political goods exhibit the characteristics o f non-rivalry, 
non-excludability and non-divisibility. The political right to free speech is as close to 
a purely political good as the lighthouse is to a purely public good. Therefore, the 
political rights of free speech will be useful to test the hypothesis.
Free speech definitely has characteristics o f non-rivalry. It is difficult to argue 
that one persons use o f speech “uses up'' the speech, so that there is less speech left 
for the next person. In essence, the amount of speech is not finite. Or, speech is 
rarely subject to a zero-sum  gain mentality. Just as it was argued that captains 
looking at the light from  the lighthouse do not decrease the am ount o f light left for the 
next ship, people speaking in public, in newspapers or on television do not leave less 
speech available for the next person.
There are, o f course, no absolutes. On a theoretical level speech is com pletely 
non-rivalry. On a practical level, there are possibilities for rivalry. Just as a road can 
be non-rivalry in theory but exhibit some level o f rivalry during a traffic jam , speech 
too can diverge from the ideal. Television has a limited number o f hours.
Newspapers have a lim ited amount o f space. Conventions can only allow so many
14 From this point on quotations will not be used for either term. It is
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people to speak. However, it would not be unfair to suggest that speech exhibits 
strong tendencies towards non-rivalry.
Can someone be excluded from free speech? It is possible, but unlikely.
Once a right like free speech is granted, it is usually granted to everyone. The First 
Amendment made no attempt to delegate free speech rights based on gender, 
ethnicity, or religion. In fact, the 14th Amendm ent almost ensures that political rights 
will be non-excludable via its “equal protection” clause. Once political rights are 
granted, the Supreme Court typically puts a heavy burden on any argument seeking to 
exclude a group from  protection.1"
There are, o f course, exceptions. The Hatch Act excludes government 
employees from certain types o f speech. Provisions for the limitation of foreign 
lobbyists could be viewed as a case o f excludability. However, these examples 
represent small groups and are justified (in the courts) as necessary to the greater 
good. Again, like the lighthouse, once a public good or political right exists, or is 
enforced, it is very difficult to exclude anyone from using the good or right.
And finally, are political rights non-divisible? Free speech appears to support 
such an assertion. Is it possible to grant shares o f free speech? Do certain people get 
more free speech than others? Like economic public goods, political rights are 
typically allocated in lump sums. An individual either gets all or nothing. Rationing 
becomes extrem ely impractical. Just as the lighthouse could not give more light to
assumed that these are hypothetical definitions.
15 Robert Bork, “The Constitution, Original Intent and Economic R ights,” 
(San Diego Law Review  23, No. 4, 1986), 823.
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one ship over another, political systems have a difficult time granting more speech to 
one person than another.
The flip side of this inquiry asks whether private goods are like economic 
rights. Or, do econom ic rights exhibit the characteristics of rivalry, excludability and 
divisibility. To test this hypothesis, I will use a government grant as an example of an 
economic right.
Government grants suffer the characteristic o f rivalry. Rivalry is typically 
determined by whether or not the good or right in question has an infinite or finite 
supply. Whereas speech may be infinite, government resources (money) are not. The 
limited amount of dollars available for grants creates an economic zero-sum gain, i.e., 
for every dollar allocated to research grants, one less dollar is available for other 
groups seeking funding from the government. Every dollar spent on education is a 
dollar that can not be spent on subsidies. At times, Congress has attempted to avoid 
the limitations o f rivalry by deficit spending. In the end, the national debt and the 
interest on debt, simply delayed loss allocation.
Grants are also excludable. When a grant is offered to an AIDS researcher at 
the University o f M ichigan, there is nothing that requires the government to offer the 
same grant to any other researcher. In fact, rivalry for finite funds makes 
excludability absolutely necessary. Excludability is required to deal with the fact that 
finite resources demand political systems to make choices between Person A or 
Person B or Group A over Group B.
Grants are divisible. W ith the lighthouse, light could not be rationed out in 
any manner other than 100% or nothing. With an econom ic right, every individual or
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group can be vested with a different amount of the right. W hile thousands o f grants 
are offered every year, none are for the same amount.
If it can be accepted that political rights, in general, have the same 
characteristics as public goods, and economic rights, in general, have the same 
characteristics as private goods, then one can make generalized assumptions about 
how people will react to the allocation o f each. Econom ists have determ ined that 
individuals react differently to the allocation o f private and public goods. Therefore, 
it is possible that people react differently to the “allocation” o f political and economic 
rights. If this is true, then it may offer some insight as to why people react with 
differing intensities to different political issues.16
16 The term political in this instance does not refer to the same use o f political 
in the term “political rights.” In this instance, political refers to the political process.
CHAPTER 5
“The Intensity o f Interests”
The first chapter o f this thesis provided a general overview of D ahl’s notions
of democracy as contained within M adison’s constitutional framework. The second
chapter suggested the possibility that rights could be divided into two groups based
on criteria established by econom ists to differentiate between public and private
goods. That is, Chapter Two simply offered definitions o f political and economic
rights. However, one m ust explain why creating such a dichotomy is useful for
understanding dem ocratic theory. This chapter will make the assertion that economic
rights attract a higher level o f intensity than do political rights, and it will offer
possible reasons w hy econom ic rights attract a more intense level o f participation.
First, it is necessary to have a complete understanding of what Dahl meant by
intensity o f  participation and why he felt it was im portant to understand intensity in
relation to the dem ocratic process. In A Preface to Democratic Theory Dahl asked,
“W hat if the m inority prefers its alternative much more passionately than the m ajority
prefers a contrary alternative? Does the majority principle still make sense?” This is
the fundamental problem  that intensity presents to the democratic process. He
continues w ith the assertion that,
Intensity is alm ost a modem psychological version o f natural rights. For 
just as M adison believed that government should be constructed so as to 
prevent m ajorities from invading the natural rights of minorities, so a 
modem  M adison might argue that government should be designed to 
inhibit a relatively apathetic majority from cram ming its policy down the 
throats o f a relatively intense m inority.1
Clearly, this is a norm ative argument. It could just as easily be argued that no matter
how intense a m inority might feel about an issue, they are still a minority. D ahl’s
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argument could be turned around to suggest that any time an intense minority rules 
over a majority, no matter how apathetic that majority may be, that there has been a 
breakdown in the dem ocratic process.
Dahl argues that intensity, in general, is extremely difficult to measure 
empirically, but it is an observable characteristic none the less. Because there are no 
precise ways of measuring severity or intensity of conflict, and it is therefore difficult 
to compare the intensity o f one conflict with another, it is difficult to explain how that 
intensity plays a role in deciding the outcome of the dem ocratic process.2 However, 
Dahl counters,
If one is prepared to accept as indices threats or moves to disrupt the 
constitutional system, threatened or actual violence against or on 
behalf of national policies, or expressions by sober and informed 
observers or participants that a given conflict will lead to disruption 
revolution, or civil war, then the weight of the historical evidence seems 
to offer solid support to the contrary.3
Dahl notes that historically, America has faced about one “intense conflict” per
generation. He makes no m ention as to whether the intense conflict is an “intense
m inority” or an “intense m ajority.” His point is that “intensity,” in general, is a
destabilizing force in polyarchy. He cites such exam ples as the Alien and Sedition
Acts, the Hartford Convention, the Civil War and the Election o f 1876. Dahl rarely
identifies intense groups as being either an “intense m inority” or an “intense
m ajority.” Dahl argues that majorities rarely form. He believes that multiple
1 Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, 90.
2 Ibid., 102.
3 Robert Dahl, Democracy, Liberty and Equality, 170.
m inorities unite temporarily to motivate political action.4 However, the primary 
focus o f this thesis is to identify the role intense minority  groups play in the political 
process and identify the causes o f such groups. Dahl is probably correct when he 
asserts that intense majorities will always achieve their goals regardless of 
constitutional or institutional checks.
It is important for Dahl to understand the nature o f intensity in his pluralist 
model. According to Dahl, pluralism  functions on a relationship between autonomy 
and control.'^ Individual factions need to be autonomous enough to assert preferences 
and freely threaten leaders with removal if their demands are not met. However, 
factions also need to be controlled enough to prevent them from doing harm to the 
public good.6 In a pluralist society, the state is not the only institution that can control 
or lim it the autonomy o f factions. O ther factions can also serve this function. 
Therefore, the intensity in which factions participate in a pluralist society becomes 
important in predicting political outcomes. Dahl attempts to ascribe measurable 
characteristics to factions in order to measure their intensity. However, he is not 
satisfied with the results. He confesses, “Alas, satisfactory measures for describing 
amounts o f influence, control, power, and so on are much more elusive than 
quantitative measures for describing wealth and incom e.”7
4 It should be noted that such a philosophy again shows the similarity Dahl has 
with M adisonian thought. M adison also believed the majorities would be temporary 
and the collection of several m inority factions.
5 Robert Dahl, Dilemmas o f  Pluralist Democracy, 16.
6 Ibid., 17.
7 Robert Dahl, A Preface to D em ocratic Theory, 78.
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For Dahl, too much intensity could dismantle his polyarchal form a 
government. A consensus o f norms and a lack o f extreme cleavages is a prerequisite 
for polyarchy to form. However, as intense conflicts arise stable polyarchy becomes 
less likely.8 Furtherm ore, Dahl asserts that intensity of interest detracts citizens from 
pursuing the “politics of v irtue /’ In other words, intensity o f interest is detrimental to 
the ancient Greek concept o f the public good.9
D ahl’s concern over intensity leads him to advocate forms of consociational 
dem ocracy.10 This presents difficulties for anyone studying D ahl’s views with 
respect to dem ocratic theory. He appears to be a strong advocate of a “purer” form of 
dem ocracy and is typically an advocate of majoritarian ru le .11 However, the 
consociational model, or what Dahl terms the “consensus m odel” o f  democracy 
provides “m inority vetoes” to almost every relevant group in society. It is ironic that 
D ahl’s main criticism  of federalism is that it provides too many sub-systems (states) 
with m inority veto power. This contradiction, if  nothing else, provides insight into 
D ahl’s concern with the role of intensity in the dem ocratic process. It also shows that 
intensity is a concept that he never completely integrated into his holistic democratic 
theory. In fact, most o f his later writings completely ignore the role o f intensity.
This may be a tacit admission that it is a concept that he is unable to deal with.
8 Robert Dahl, D emocracy and Its Critics, 135.
9 See next section titled “Normative Questions.” It is argued that intensity 
should be viewed as a value neutral term. In certain cases, intensity could be used to 
promote the “politics o f virtue.”
10 Dahl exhibited interest in this form of government as early as his doctoral 
dissertation.
In fact, Dahl notes that the problem of intensity of m inority groups has led 
most polyarchies to adopt some form o f government other than a strictly majoritarian
i •*>
system. ~ He cites Arend Lijphart’s study of twenty-six stable polyarchies. Of the
1 ^twenty-six countries studied, only six are classified as purely majoritarian. All 
others have either a “m ajoritarian-federal,” “consensual-unitary” or a “consensual” 
system o f democracy. Dahl argues that there are only three types o f systems in 
which intensity is not a problem. They are (1) nations that have extremely 
homogeneous populations, (2) nations where the m inority parties never feel their 
fundamental rights are endangered and (3) nations where the minority feels there is a 
strong possibility that they could become the majority in the fu ture.14
In D ahl’s later works, he began to move away from the argum ent that 
intensity of minority groups was the primary hindrance to a m ajoritarian system .'5 
He began to turn to unequal resources as the most significant barrier to creating a 
more democratic, and in many ways, a more majoritarian system. However, the two 
interpretations are not fundamentally different. In his early work, he suggested that 
intensity obscured true power relationships in a pluralist society. In his later work, he
11 Ibid., 160.
1 ^“ Dahl identifies several types o f intense groups. The different types of 
intense groups will be discussed in length in Chapter 6.
13 Ibid., 160.
14 Ibid., 161.
15 W hen Dahl discusses intense groups, he typically is referring to minority 
groups. He contends that majorities seldom form. W hen they do form, they are an 
am algamation o f several minorities. However, this thesis is prim arily concerned with 
the ability of small groups (minorities) with high levels o f intensity to tyrannize over 
the majority.
argues that unequal financial resources obscures “fair" power rela tionships.16 It is 
not difficult to see that the approach to his argument has changed tracks, but the 
destination remains the same. The results are the same, whether factions gain 
inordinent am ounts o f influence via intensity or wealth. The issue eventually evolves 
into one o f power. If one replaces the concepts o f intensity or wealth with power, 
D ahl’s argum ent in the first chapters o f A Preface to Economic Democracy appears to 
suggest more consistency on his part. “W e must strive to reduce the adverse effects 
on dem ocracy and political equality that result when economic liberty produces great 
inequality in the distribution o f resources and thus, directly and indirectly, of 
pow er.” 17
A lthough it is not expressly stated in any o f D ahl’s work, there is an obvious 
impression that he views intensity as a negative. He views it as a distortion to the 
democratic process. Intensity is something that must be accounted for by creating 
institutions or processes that move political systems away from majoritarian rule. His 
attitude most likely stems from two beliefs. First, Dahl views polyarchy as a step in 
the direction o f a more pure form of democracy. Therefore, anything that disturbs 
this evolutionary process would probably be viewed as a negative. Second, Dahl 
adamantly feels that minorities tyrannize over majorities much more often than the 
other way around. This returns one to the fundamental difference between Dahl and 
M adison. M adison wanted to protect minorities from tyrannous majorities. Dahl 
views the problem  in exactly opposite terms. He wants to protect majorities from
16 This is obviously a normative assertion that will be dealt with in subsequent 
sections.
17 Robert Dahl, A Preface to Economic Democracy, 51.
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intense, tyrannous minorities. This contradiction requires one to look at intensity 
with as little bias as possible and attempt to ascertain when intense minorities could 
be viewed as a positive aspect o f democracy and when they could be viewed as 
detrimental.
NORMATIVE QUESTIONS
All normative issues about intensity revolve around two questions. W hen is
an intense m inority a danger to majority rule or the rights o f the populace? In other
words, there are times when a minority can abuse its veto pow er by preventing
legislation deem ed im portant by the majority. And, when does an intense minority
act as protector o f justice? There are also times when intense m inorities advocate
issues which are “morally right” against the will of the majority. For instance,
speaking from a value-laden perspective, the small minority of Senators who
prevented and delayed the Civil Rights Act o f the 1960s could be viewed as a
negative intense minority. Conversely, and also speaking from a value laden
perspective, the small intense minority that advocated the abolitionist movement of
the 1850s could be viewed as a positive intense minority.
A lthough Dahl tends to view intense minorities from a negative perspective,
he is aware o f what he calls “theoretical problem s.” 18 “To begin w ith,” he writes,
in order to judge when a majority misuses its powers by 
wronging its adversaries, obviously we need some criteria. W hat 
should these criteria be? Are we to say then, that whenever the 
interests of the m inority are opposed to those o f the majority, a
18 Ibid., 14.
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majority necessarily misuses its power simply because it acts to 
secure its own interests?19
O f course, the same arguments could be made substituting “the m ajority '’ for "the
m inority.” In order to answer his own question, Dahl seeks to set up criteria by which
to distinguish injustice from straightforward use o f power. He argues that if  tyranny
is defined too narrowly, i.e., any action that is detrimental to anyone’s interests, then
all action by a m ajority or m inority could be interpreted as tyranny. This does set up
a tension between what is unjust and what is tyrannous. Omitting, for one moment,
the value questions around the term  ‘unjust,’ Dahl argues that if employers are
guaranteed the right to hire child labor, there is an injustice present. However, if the
government forbids the use o f child labor, then the employers might view that move
as tyrannical.
Conversely, if the majority is able to determine what is “ju s t” w ithout limits to 
this power, then one runs the risk o f asserting that the democratic process can never 
be unjust. Thus, if we cannot devise criteria for majority tyranny, then it becomes 
difficult to ascribe meaning to any study trying to understand the role of intense 
minorities in the democratic process. As a result, Dahl engages in a tortured attempt 
to define which rights are inalienable and which are not.20 He ends up concluding 
that dem ocracy itself is a fundamental right superior to other rights, mainly property 
rights. Dahl, in essence, is creating a hierarchy of rights. This hierarchy places an 
individual’s right to dem ocratically control all associations, including economic 
associations, superior to an individual’s right to private property. He does this in
19 Ibid., 14.
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order to reconcile his desire to justify popular control of economic firms, but at the 
same time, not appear to be justifying the violation of a “fundamental right.” If the 
“fundamental right” to property is inferior to the “fundamental right” to majority rule, 
then Dahl can have it both ways.
Dahl is also concerned about the effects of intensity on political integration 
and the public pursuit o f “civic virtue.” Dahl sees intensity as a hindrance to creating 
political consensus. He argues that with the rise o f corporate capitalism, political 
fragmentation has increased. Every interest group has the ability, and often the 
resources, to promote its own economic agenda. However, as intensity of demand 
increases, the possibility for political integration decreases. Dahl notes that over the 
past few decades, political participation by interest groups has become more intense. 
He cites as causes the ability for interest groups to use direct mailings, easier access 
to money and the rise o f single-issue interest groups. He concludes that if this 
phenom enon is not checked in some general way, democracies will see an increasing 
am ount of delegation o f responsibilities by legislatures to independent, unelected 
associations.21 The other possibility is that democracies will see an increasing 
number of issues decided by referendum. If this became the case, it could be argued 
that society is becom ing more democratic as a result of intense demands by minority 
interest groups.22
20 Ibid., 53-56.
'y j
Robert Dahl, Dilemmas o f  Pluralist Democracy, 80.
It is interesting to note that Dahl, a preeminent democratic theorist 
contributes almost no scholarship to the effects o f the initiative process in democratic 
theory.
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Frances Piven and Richard Cloward argue that political participation, with 
respect to econom ic issues, has increased in intensity. In their study of the American 
electorate they noted that the increasing com plexities of the American economy 
encouraged business leaders to create a political infrastructure capable of conducting 
national election cam paigns.23 They also record that the amount o f interest group 
activity began to rise in response to increasing econom ic regulation by the 
government. They conclude that such intense lobbying has created election victories 
for candidates who do not have the majority support o f the electorate.24
Dahl also notes a paradox created by increasing intensity of participation. He 
argues that large-scale democracies need active pluralism  to survive. He understands 
that pluralism requires a variety of interest groups to pursue their own agenda on the 
basis of self and group interest. However, he also notes that fragmentation leads to a 
decrease in civic virtue.25 As people become more self-interested, they conversely 
become less interested in civic virtue. In fact, some Congressmen have noted that 
Congress itself has begun to view certain associations, i.e. farm associations with 
respect to subsidy policies, as the only relevant body of people they need to consider 
with respect to certain issues.26 In some cases, the civic virtue of the group has 
becomes more important than the civic virtue of the entire populace.
"3 Pivin and Cloward, Why Americans D on 't Vote, 10.
24 Ibid., 11.
25 Robert Dahl, “The Ills o f the System ”, 447.
26 Pat W illiams, interviewed by the author, M issoula, MT., 26 November
1998.
Other theorists, besides Dahl, have noted that small groups tend to have a 
higher level o f intensity, and thus have the ability to promote their agenda to a higher 
degree than their numbers warrant.27 In other words, what small groups could never 
achieve through a simple majority rule procedure, they can accomplish through 
small, intense, group lobbying efforts. Both V.O. Key and David Truman appear to 
support D ahl’s contention that polyarchies are dom inated by several intense 
minorities rather than an apathetic majority. M ancur Olson notes that pluralism  is 
based on the concept that as one interest group m akes outrageous demands on society, 
other interest groups will mobilize to counterbalance those demands, thus promoting 
a “reasonably just and satisfactory” outcome. However, he contends this is not an 
accurate description o f pluralism. “Since relatively small groups will be able 
voluntarily to organize and act in support o f their com mon interests,” he argues, “and 
since large groups normally will not be able to do so, the outcome o f the political 
struggle among the various groups in society will not be symmetrical.28
He concludes that politicians have long understood that small groups with 
vested interests have disproportionate amounts o f power. Again, the value 
implications here cannot be avoided. The use o f the term  “disproportionate amount 
of power” implies an “unfair” amount of power. M ost o f the examples Olson and 
Key use to illustrate their position highlight negative results from intense minority 
efforts. This thesis does not attempt to distinguish between “good” and “bad”
-)7
'  Other theorists (Olson included) note that small groups achieve their 
political goals more often, not because of intensity reasons, but because they have a 
more focused agenda to pursue.
' 8 M ancur Olson, The Logic o f  Collective Action, 127.
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intensity. It simply attempts to offer an explanation as to how groups acquire 
differing levels o f intensity. This is the subject we will turn to next.
ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND INCREASED LEVELS OF INTENSITY
In the final chapter o f this thesis, I will engage Dahl in a “conversation” about 
how he would react to my contention, first, that all rights can be placed on a spectrum 
ranging between purely econom ic rights to purely political rights. Once again, the 
criteria used to determ ine which end of the spectrum a “right” would lean towards 
was adopted from  econom ic collective action theory. Secondly, econom ic rights 
attract a higher level of intensity and participation than political rights. The reasons 
are: (1) econom ic rights exhibit a zero-sum gain nature w ith regards to their 
allocation (2) political rights exhibit a free-rider problem  and thus attract less 
intensity (3) econom ic rights create a higher level o f incentive because they have a 
tendency to provide more opportunities for personal gain, and (4) economic issues 
tend to revolve around m inority groups and the sm aller the group the greater ability 
to mobilize in a pluralist system.
Eventually, most debates about the allocation o f econom ic rights boil down to 
a question o f equity .29 For exam ple, as taxes are altered, budget priorities are shifted 
or regulations added or erased, some individual or group gains equity and other 
individuals or groups lose equity. This is the unavoidable consequence o f zero-sum 
games. It is always very easy to allocate economic gains. The difficulty lies in
29 Lester Thurow, The Zero-Sum Society, 189.
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allocating the loses.30 In a pluralist society, where groups have the right and the
ability to mobilize, decisions are not made on a purely normative rational. It would
appear logical that the groups that mobilize with the most power, or perhaps the most
intensity, would have the best chance of avoiding loss allocation.
Historically, econom ic growth has made these decisions e a s i e r . A s  the size
of the “economic pie” has increased economic allocation could be altered without
requiring any group to accept a loss. In this scenario, com prom ise and consensus
become an easier process. As long as the argument revolves around who gets more,
instead of. who gets less, intensity o f participation will be le ss ."
In contrast, to protect our own income, we will fight to stop economic change
from happening even if the policy change will help improve the standard o f living for
the majority of the populace/ Lester Thurow writes,
The problem with zero-sum games is that the essence o f the problem 
solving is loss allocation. But this is precisely what our political 
process is least capable of doing. When there are econom ic gains to 
be allocated, our political process can allocate them. W hen there are 
large economic losses to be allocated, our political process is paralyzed.34
Thurow would appear to agree that economic rights attract a higher level of
participation than do political rights, although he substitutes the concept intensity for
“militancy.” He argues that minority groups have learned to use an easily accessible
30 Ibid., 11-15.
31 Ibid., 14.
32 This is not always the case. In the social security debate of 1994 the issue 
was whether seniors should get a 2% cola or a 5% cola.
33 Ibid., 12.
leeal svstem com bined with a little militancy to delay or paralyze any program that is 
detrimental to their econom ic livelihood. In essence, because economic rights are a 
zero-sum game and require loss allocation for some group, economic rights will, 
therefore, attract the participation of militant groups trying to prevent such a loss. 
Such an argum ent may account for the significant increase in the number of 
registered political action committees over the past 30 years.’6 (See figure 1)
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It might be helpful to offer a hypothetical situation to further illustrate the 
concept of intensity caused by zero-sum games. A government deciding to set up a 
random sobriety check on Friday nights is a political rights issue. There is no rivalry 
associated with this act. No segment o f the population gains at the expense of 
another. It is more a question of the public's right to privacy versus the public’s right
■5 Ibid.. 12
Jeffery Berry. Interest Group Society (New York: Pantheon Books. 1992).
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to safe roads. The sobriety check will (ideally) apply to all citizens equally. 6 
Therefore, there is no zero-sum mentality associated with the debate over this issue.
In contrast, a decision to decrease M edicare benefits in order to pay for a capital gain 
tax cut could exhibit strong zero-sum arguments. One segment o f the population 
(those who own property) would gain at the direct expense o f another segment of the 
population (the elderly or sick). The contention is that it is likely that more intensity 
will be displayed in the later issue that the first. The later exam ple is a zero-sum 
situation, the previous one is not.
Some theorists argue that the social acceptance of zero-sum mentality is the 
result o f political isolation. Robert Bellah, a communitarian, suggests that 
individualism is more moderate than rampant egoism, but that the end results are the 
same. “Individualism is a calm and considered feeling which disposes each citizen to 
isolate him self from the mass o f his fellows and w ithdraw .. .he gladly leaves the 
greater society to look out after itself.”37 DeTocquiville envisioned the same 
consequences. He warned that if  people become too focused on their individual 
econom ic needs, they will lose the tendency to look at society’s needs. “Citizens who 
are bound to take part in public affairs,” he observed, “must turn from private 
interests and occasionally take a look at something other than them selves.” ’8 If 
people do not “turn from private interests,” Michael Sandel argues that people will 
use freedom for the sole purpose o f economic self-interest, thus, the republican ideal
36 O f course a social factor such as racism could cause a selective enforcement 
o f such a policy.
37 Amitai Etzoni. Rights and the Common Good: A  Communitarian 
Perspective. (New York: St. M artin’s Press, 1995), 42.
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that society should interact to determine the “public good” will fade and self- 
government in general will be unable to sustain itself.
The fact that these authors offer such warnings highlights the implications of 
intense economic minorities acquiring inordinate political power. They are 
suggesting the possibility that if society fractures itself into multiple intense minority 
economic groups, “civic society” as envision by classic republican thinkers, will be 
difficult, if  not im possible to achieve.
FREE-RIDER PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL RIGHTS
If econom ic rights attract more intensity, then conversely political rights 
attract less intensity. However, do political rights simply attract less intensity because 
they are not econom ic rights, or is there something fundamental about political rights 
that cause less intensity? One possible explanation is that political rights attract free 
riders just like voluntary public goods attract free riders.
Those who act as free riders on public goods believe that offering to pay for a 
public good does not serves a personal interest. The free rider assumes that the public 
good will be produced whether he contributes to its production or not. Therefore, the 
free rider envisions a scenario in which his costs are zero, but his benefits are 
positive. The same logic can be applied to political rights. If a citizen knows that a 
political right, if allocated, will be allocated to everyone in society, and that everyone 
will have access to the same “am ount” o f the right, such a scenario creates a 
disincentive to lobby the government. In fact, it would create a disincentive to
38 Alex DeTocquiville, Dem ocracy in America,
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participate at any level. The free-rider citizen knows that if others lobby the 
government to protect or enforce a right, that enforcem ent will not be limited to the 
group who lobbied or to the group the lobbyists represent.39
Again a hypothetical might be helpful. A group o f citizens may mobilize to 
lobby the government to reduce the number of armaments it maintains. Their 
professed goal is to ensure a more peaceful society. A peaceful society is a “political 
good” that exhibits characteristics of a public good. If the mobilized lobbyists are 
successful, “peace” will be granted to everyone, not ju st the group that participated in 
the political system. Furthermore, every citizen will get the same “am ount” of peace. 
Therefore, because every citizen knows that the benefits will be distributed to all, 
they have a disincentive to participate. W hy would they expend personal resources, 
such as money and time, to a cause in which they would benefit just as much as one 
who did expend his or her resources? In other words, if  “others” will acquire peace 
for my society, why should I expend resources for that which I can receive for free?
Interestingly, Leon Hadar, an international relations theorist, has come to 
similar conclusions. Buchannan and Tullock. in their work The Calculus o f  Consent, 
argued that the amount of resources expended to mobilize interest groups is a direct 
function o f the “political profits” such groups expected to receive in return for their 
lobbying efforts.40 Hadar argues that such a conclusion explains why there is limited 
domestic lobbying in the realm of international relations. Because foreign policy 
decisions, in general, affect the entire populace it is hard for individual interest
39 In this sense, ‘lobbyist’ refers to anyone who makes political dem ands from
the government, not ju st hired or professional lobbyists.
41 Hadar, Leon. Quagmire. W ashington D.C.: The Cato Institute, 1992.
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groups to reap "political profits." Thus, he concludes there is less incentive for 
groups to m obilize around international issues.
However, there is another possible explanation for such a lack o f 
mobilization. In many respects, foreign policy decisions are exam ples of public 
goods. O ther than issues that revolve around foreign aid or international recognition 
o f patent rights, few international issues exhibit characteristics of rivalry. For 
instance, recognizing a foreign government, granting most favored nation status and 
agreeing to arms limitations are not issues which have a zero-sum incentive structure, 
nor are they divisible or excludable “rights.” Therefore, it is equally possible, 
contrary to H adar’s arguments, that the reason less participation occurs around 
international issues is that it is very easy to be a free-rider with respect to these issues.
One possible example of this phenom enon is that researchers have noted that 
the anti-nuclear w ar effort during the 1980s suffered from a form of a free-rider 
problem. M any o f the people they interviewed expressed opinions that im plied their 
level o f participation in the political system with respect to nuclear w eapons was 
minimal because they felt “other” activists would sufficiently address the issue. 
A lthough Dahl suggested that intensity can not be measured, other political scientists 
have argued that “ issue salience” can be an accurate measure o f intensity and they 
argue that issue salience can be measured em pirically.41 Some political scientists 
have done em pirical research to determine if a free-rider phenomenon truly exists. In 
1989 a series o f studies was conducted on issue salience and anti-nuclear war activity. 
The study concluded that as issue salience increased so did political participation.
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In a later study, issue salience researchers concluded that there was a direct
- p  . .
connection between econom ic issues and higher issue salience. “ In an empirical 
study, they noted that social justice issues attracted far less Political Action 
Committee money than did economic issues. They also noted that economic issues 
attracted more special interest group mobilization than did social justice issues.
M any o f their conclusions support O lson’s contention that small groups w ith a 
specific agenda, especially an economic agenda, have a high level of political efficacy 
and participate more than large groups or groups that have political issues as their 
main concern.
A variety o f political scientists have concluded that small groups are often 
times more effective and intense in their participation than large groups.43 In fact,
Dahl himself, along with Edward Tufte, recognizes the pow er of small groups. In 
Size and D em ocracy , they argue that small nations have characteristics that allow 
them to defeat large nations, not only militarily, but often times econom ically.44 
Professor Olson notes the same phenom enon, but with respect to interests groups 
within a nation as opposed to nations themselves. He states, “The sm aller groups—
41 Robert Berstien. “ Issue position and issue salience,” Political Reasearch 
Quarterly 48, no. 3 (Sept 1995): 479.
42 George Edwards. “The significance o f issue salience,” American Journal of 
Political Science 39, no. 1 (Feb 1995): 108.
43 Lee Fox and Janet Ward. "Issue salience, perceived efficacy and perceived 
risk." Journal o f Applied Social Psychology 19, no. 10 (July 1989): 805-828.
44 Dahl and Tufte, Size and Democracy, 118-120.
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the privileged and intermediate groups can often defeat the large groups— the latent
groups— which are supposed to prevail in a dem ocracy."45
W hat is interesting to note, and both Dahl and Olson fail to do so. is that every
example either author gave o f small groups overpowering large groups dealt with an
economic issue. N either author ever offered an exam ple where a small group
defeated a large group on a political issue. A lthough this is not conclusive proof that
economic rights foster intense minority activity, it does show that Dahl and others
recognized the relationship between economic rights and levels o f intensity and
political participation.
O f course, econom ic issues provide an opportunity for personal gain. That
there is a relationship between personal incentive for personal gain is a so well
established that there is no need to develop it here. However, it is im portant to note
that economic issues provide an opportunity for personal gain more than do political
rights. Again, Olson writes,
The lobbies o f large economic groups are the by-products o f organizations 
that have the capacity to mobilize a latent group with selective incentives.
The only organizations that have the selective incentives available are those 
that (1) have the authority and the capacity to be coercive, or (2) have a 
source o f positive inducements that they can offer the individuals in the 
latent groups.
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that small groups, which tend to be groups 
seeking econom ic rights and have a personal incentive for economic gain, have a 
greater ability to affect the political system because o f the increased levels o f political 
participation.
45 Olson, The Logic o f  Collective Action, 127
CHAPTER 6
D AH L’S RESPONSE
Chapter 5 will exam ine how Dahl would respond to the contention that the 
zero-sum nature of some rights, prim arily economic rights, creates a higher level of 
intensity in political participation. By exam ining the works o f Dahl, he will be drawn 
into a “conversation” with respect to the argument presented in this p a p e r .1 An 
interesting place to begin such a conversation is by exam ining D ahl’s desire to create 
a holistic theory of democracy. Dahl is very consistent, from his early works to his 
later works, in declaring that he seeks to combine normative and empirical aspects of 
democratic theory.2
As an early advocate o f the behavioral revolution, Dahl wanted to be able to 
predict the behavior o f citizens in a democracy by developing better democratic 
m odels.3 Just as Anthony Downs and other rational-choice theorist of the late 1950s 
tried to superimpose economic theory on democratic theory, much of D ahl’s work 
suggests that he too sought to examine economic influences on democratic systems. 
From his early work with Charles Lindblom in Politics, Economics and Welfare to his 
own work in A Preface to Economic Democracy, he seeks to explain the role of 
economic influences with respect to voter behavior. Thus, it is likely that Dahl would 
support an attempt to connect economic pressures with explanations for democratic 
behavior.
1 Technique borrowed from Robert B ellah’s “Quest for S e lf ’ in which he 
entered into a “conversation” with Ralph W. Emerson.
•y
" Dahl, D emocracy and Its Critics, 6.
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Indeed, Dahl argues that it was a mistake for democratic theorists to “divorce 
neoclassical econom ics and political science."4 He argues that too many econom ists 
are disdainful o f political realities for their theories to have practical relevance. At the 
same time, Dahl also argues that, in general, political scientists are ignorant of 
economic forces and therefore many o f their analyses are incom plete/ It for this 
reason that Dahl rejects forms of democratic socialism that rely on state ownership of 
industry. A ccording to Dahl, Politics, Economics and Welfare and the introduction of 
the term polyarchy was his first attempt to unify free market economic theory and 
political theory. He explains that social democrats are "admirably com mitted to
ti
political dem ocracy” but their ignorance of "the importance of markets as a means o f 
allocating resources” limits the feasibility of their approach. Therefore, Dahl suggests 
that democratic socialism  must be a market-based socialism. Such a conclusion 
emphasizes the im portance Dahl places on understanding free market economic 
forces in order to create a comprehensive democratic theory.
If one is to understand the impact of free markets on political systems, one 
must understand that capitalism  is a competitive system. The competition results 
from the fact that econom ics is the process of allocating finite resources. Although 
Dahl does not specifically mention or analyze economic rights from a zero-sum
3 Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, 51.
4 Dahl, Justifying Democracy, 3.
3 However, it is a valid argument to suggest M adison was aware of free 
markets and their influences on politics. Primarily his concern with “the unequal 
distribution o f w ealth” as cited in Federalist #  10. In addition, political scientists such
1 0 1
perspective, he seems to inherently understand that econom ic rights are less 
conducive to political consensus than political rights. Almost every example Dahl 
uses to illustrate deficiencies in majoritarian democracy are economic examples.
Also, most exam ples Dahl uses to justify  corporatists structures are economic 
examples. Dahl notes that many critics o f pluralist democracy contend that pluralism 
is “a system in which private groups wrongfully appropriate public functions. The 
main culprits are usually identified as economic organizations.”6 He cites the 
decision making process that determined tariff policy in the 1930s and the budgetary 
process of the 1970s as prime exam ples.7 He argues that a majority of citizens 
wanted lower tariffs in the 1930s but individual econom ic interest groups 
overwhelmed the Congress with intense lobbying efforts and “distorted the public 
agenda.” He appears to agree with the critics o f pluralism  in his admission, “Crucial 
decisions on econom ic matters are said to be outside the effective control of the 
national legislature.”9
Dahl also argues that interests groups that lobby for economic interests are 
more successful that other interest groups.10 He cites specific examples such as issue
as Charles Lindblom, Anthony Downs and James Buchannan were exam ining the 
influences of market capitalism  on political systems.
6 Dahl, D ilemmas o f  Pluralist Democracy, 47.
7 Ibid., 45.
8 Ibid., 46.
9 Ibid., 47.
10 Ibid., 66.
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that revolve around wages, prices and investments. Their success is typically the
result o f higher levels o f political participation intensity.
Because Dahl understands that intensity of interest is dangerous to stable
polyarchies and intensity o f interest most com m only occurs around economic
interests, he generally supports corporatist structures. He states,
Thus as the strength and distinctiveness of a country’s subcultures 
increase, the chances for polyarchy should decline. Subcultures 
typically formed around ethnic, religious, racial or linguistic 
differences... and ideology.11
In essence, Dahl is once again arguing that if distinct groups become too inwardly
focused on group accomplishm ents, and gains, pluralism might not mediate societal
tensions without some type o f corporatists structures. If one adds to D ahl’s list,
economic concerns, and often times Dahl does, then a clear stream of logic becomes
obvious. Dahl admits that pluralism  fails in the face o f intense factionalism. He
concludes that in order to avoid civic strife, succession or extra-legal lobbying efforts,
a corporatist system must be developed.12 Therefore, if Dahl concedes that political
cleavages, at times, require consociationalism, then intense economic cleavages must
require the same solution. However, since Dahl identifies economic causes of
gridlock much more often than political causes, it would appear rational to assume
that Dahl would in fact support the contention that economic rights, via their zero-
sum characteristics, have a greater tendency towards political system gridlock than
political rights.
11 Dahl, D em ocracy and Its Critics, 254.
12 Ibid., 257.
Such conclusions lead one to an analysis o f D ahl's mathematical and graphical 
examination of intensity in A Preface to Democratic Theory. Dahl discusses a variety 
of possibilities with respect to agreement and disagreement symmetries and 
asymmetries. In other words, he not only analyzes how people's opinions differ, but 
how intensity of their beliefs may threaten a stable polyarchy. The reason for doing 
so is “the com parison o f intensities is important [because o f ] a desire to predict the 
stability of dem ocratic system and perhaps design rule to ensure its stability." In 
Figure 1 he describes a situation in which there is a strong consensus and most of the 
intense voters are on one side of the issue. Note that not only are most people in favor 
of the imaginary policy, but most the intense supporters are on the same side. In such 
a situation, political consensus is very likely. Because all the intense voters are on 
one side, and in the majority, they will not be threatened by a majoritarian system.
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Source: (Figures I -  6): Robert Dahl. A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
1954. Pp. 9 4 - 1 0 9 .
104
At first glance, one might argue that such a contention flies in the face of 
D ahl's previous argument that majorities do not rule, but that conglomeration of 
minorities rule. However, Dahl remains consistent if one assumes that the populace 
represented at point A is a collection o f m inorities and not one cohesive majority. A 
second question a critic o f Dahl might pose is: does Figure 1 represent tyranny of the 
majority? Although Dahl does not expressly address this question in A Preface to 
Democratic Theory, his later works suggest a very M adisonian answer. Majorities do 
form out of several minorities, but because they are temporary, they pose only a 
limited threat to society.
In Figure 2 the situation has changed. In this scenario, a large majority 
supports the policy but not with any level o f intensity. Also important is the fact that 
those who are intensely for or against the policy are small in number and equally 
divided. Although no em pirical research has been done. Figure 2 might represent an 
issue such as affirmative action. A majority o f people are in favor o f the policy, but 
apparently ambivalent about their support. However, there is also a minority 
intensely opposed to such a policy. Such a scenario will also have no adverse effects 
on a stable polyarchy. The intense voters are of such a small number that even if they 
did feel threatened by a majoritarian system, they would not have the political 
numbers to threaten the stability of the system.
In Figure 2, Dahl ignores a relevant question. Can the intense but small 
minority force a com prom ise with the apathetic majority? His previous discussions of 
the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s suggests he thinks they could force
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compromise, or at least slow the progress of the apathetic majority. The fact that 
Dahl seems to ignore this question highlights a larger criticism. Dahl appears to be 
more concerned with stability  than any other democratic question. He does not
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address the question, which group will prevail in the type of conflict presented in 
Figure 2 (or any o f the conflicts presented in any o f his charts)? He claimed, that in 
studying the role of intensity, he was trying to predict outcomes in a democratic 
system. However, with this form of analysis, he simply is trying to predict the 
stability of dem ocratic systems.
If D ahl’s primary concern is with the stability o f democratic systems, he also 
fails to answer an im portant question: why should stability be a valued characteristic? 
It could be easily argued that instability is necessary for political change. Dahl, by 
focusing on stability, creates a very static view o f politics that imparts some 
normative value on the status quo. However, m ilitary dictatorships and repressive
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totalitarian systems can claim  they are stable. These exam ples are antagonistic 
towards D ahl’s apparent desire for stability.
Figure 3 represents a situation in which the public disagrees about the policy, 
but the disagreement is symmetrical. That is. an equal num ber of people are slightly 
for and against the policy and an equal num ber are intensely for and against the 
policy. Figure 3 might represent an issue such as allowing gays in the military. A 
small group o f m ilitary people are intensely opposed and a small group of gay rights 
activists are intensely for the policy. However, most of the voters are not interested in 
such an issue and therefore their preferences are apathetic preferences. W hat is 
important to Dahl in this situation is that the num ber o f those intensely for and against 
the policy are a m inority o f the total voters. The symmetry of the votes is different 
from Figure 2. The distribution o f voters is not likely to create a consensus, but 
because the majority of people who disagree about the policy are apathetic in their 
desires, the losing side is not going to feel threatened. As a
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result, the losing side will not seek extra legal means in which to achieve their goals. 
Furthermore, the number o f intense voters is exactly the same as in Figure 2. a small 
portion of the populace. Again, stable polyarchy is maintained. Figure 3 also 
highlights the difference between the arguments o f “young Dahl” with the "older 
Dahl.” Figure 3 makes no reference to the possibility that, although the intense 
groups are evenly divided, it is possible that one group have more resources to 
mobilize. In his later work, Dahl does contend that resource inequalities affect the 
outcome o f situation presented in Figure 3 ( and others).
Figure 4 represents only a slight divergence from the situation in Figure 3. In 
this case, there is an asymmetrical disagreement. M ore people favor the policy than
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are opposed to it. However, again, the majority of those for and against it are not 
intense about their feelings. Those that are intense represent a minority of voters. 
Again, stable polyarchy is maintained.
Figure 5 represents the situation that Dahl fears most. In Figure 5. the 
populace has a sever and symmetrical disagreement. In this situation the population 
is evenly split with respect to adopting or rejecting the policy. The danger however, 
lies in the fact that those intensely for and against the policy are now the majority of 
voters. W hether this policy is adopted or rejected, a large amount o f the population is 
going to be intensely disappointed and maybe intensely threatened. W hen such a 
situation occurs, Dahl argues that polyarchy becom es inherently unstable.
Historically, Dahl points to the Civil W ar. He notes that large numbers of people 
were intensely opposed to slavery and a large num ber o f people were intensely in 
favor of slavery. As a result, when Lincoln was elected, the South felt so threatened 
they chose succession over acceptance of the electoral vote. Therefore. Dahl 
concludes that no constitutional system of checks and balances will create a stable 
polyarchy in all situations. He argues that social homogeneity creates stability.
W hat is relevant to this thesis is how Dahl describes situations that lead to a 
population that looks like Figure 5. First, Dahl writes, “Suppose that A prefers jc to y,
B prefers y  to x and that the choice excludes [emphasis added] the other.” “Where 
each side is large and each regards the victory o f the other as a fundamental threat to 
some very highly ranked value,” he continues, “it is reasonable to expect serious
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difficulties in the polyarchal system." It is interesting to note that Dahl is 
describing a zero-sum  situation. Those groups for and against the policy view any 
advancement by the other side as a direct loss to their side. Every time economic 
interests com pete with one another, they are com peting in the environment described 
by Dahl in Figure 5. This point is absolutely crucial with respect to arguing that Dahl 
would agree with the concept that the zero-sum nature of economic rights leads to an 
increase in the intensity o f political participation. Dahl does not argue that intensity 
of preferences causes a symmetrical severe disagreement, but that a severe 
symmetrical disagreement causes higher levels o f intensity. Such a conclusion is 
highly com patible with the hypothesis o f this thesis.
Therefore, if  one were to graph the preferences of the population with respect 
to the issue of capital gains tax cu ts13 versus social security cola increases, the graph 
would look exactly like Figure 5. A com prom ise would become almost impossible 
and the losing group, in the long run. is not going to accept the outcome. More likely, 
the losing group w ill resort to more intense political participation in the next election 
cycle. Unfortunately, the social cleavage becomes almost permanent. Just as 
elections did not solve the slavery problem of the 1850s, elections are not likely to 
solve intense, symmetrical disagreements over economic rights. That is not to argue 
that every time there is a conflict over economic rights, as described in Figure 5. there 
will be a civil war. However, democratic systems can break down in more ways than 
civil conflict. It could be argued that if  an important issue is ignored by political 
institutions, that is also a breakdown in the democratic process. For instance, if  the 
intensity of political participation surrounding Social Security reform is so intense 
that political representatives refuse to address the issue, that also could be a failure in 
the democratic system. Dahl argues that such situations become destructive to 
polyarchal systems. In fact, Dahl states that such situations described in Figure 5 “lie 
outside the capacities o f polyarchy” 14 and therefore can be ignored when discussing 
polyarchy.
In “The Ills of the System” (1993) Dahl argues that intense lobbying from “the 
pursuit o f self and group interests” which are typically economic lobbyists, “have
13 In this case, a captial gains tax cut is viewed as an expenditure, not a source 
o f revenue.
14 Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, 98.
become predominant in both the practice and language o f American politics. ' L<i This 
result is an increase in political fragmentation that does not facilitate political 
integration. He concludes that consensus on economic issues is becoming more and 
more rare. A lthough one could contend that a consensus on economic issues has 
rarely existed in any historical period, Dahl identifies the rise of “corporate 
capitalism” as the point in which disconcensus became more prominent.
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However, Dahl does argue there is a need to understand how intensities 
develop and how they can be measured because o f situations modeled in Figure 6. In 
Figure 6, Dahl is describing a situation in which there is severe but asymmetrical
15 Robert Dahl, “The Ills of the System”, 232.
disagreement. In this case, the majority of voters for a policy are apathetic in their 
preference, but the m inority o f  voters opposed to the policy  are intense in their 
preference. A good exam ple o f an issue represented in Figure 6 is environmental 
legislation. Polls show that, in general, Americans support environmental legislation. 
However, there are also small groups directly affected by the legislation that are 
intensely opposed to such legislation. So opposed that they have sought to change the 
rules of the system to achieve their goals. In the state o f W ashington, it was proposed 
by representatives in the western part o f the state, (the part most affected by 
environmental legislation supported by the eastern majority) that the western part of 
the state should secede and form  a new state o f Lincoln.
Such a situation is also a threat to stable polyarchy according to Dahl. He
concedes that Figure 6 represents a situation in which corporatists forms of
democracy may be necessary. He states,
The rules must operate so as to permit a minority veto over the majority 
only in the cases where a relatively apathetic majority would, under pure 
majoritarian rule, be able to override a relatively more intense minority.
A rule must be designed to distinguish the case of sever
asymmetrical disagreem ent from other distributions and permit a minority
veto in that case o n ly .16
It is possible that “the rule” Dahl is looking for can be found in collective action 
theory and the understanding that political and econom ic rights are subject to different 
influences as outlined in Chapter 3.
16 Dahl contend in A Preface to Democratic Theory that the minority veto 
should take place “at key stages o f the decision process -  in political parties,
In A Preface to Economic Democracy, D ahl’s m ost extensive work on the 
relationship between economic and political forces, he seems to understand, without 
stating it to the reader, that there is a difference between economic and political 
rights, as defined in this work. In citing Tocqueville, he notes that political liberty 
must be allocated in one o f only two ways. “Every citizen” he states, “must be put in 
possession of his rights , or rights must be granted to no one.” 17 In essence, Dahl is 
describing the public good characteristic of non-divisibility. Furthermore, he is 
attributing such a characteristic to political liberty. Thus, the assertion that political 
rights are similar in nature to public goods is not incompatible with the theories of 
Robert Dahl.
In addition, his understanding of the limits of economic liberty are similar to 
the concepts illustrated in the characteristic o f rivalry. W hen Dahl speaks of 
economic rights, he typically refers to property. Dahl confronts the fact that if 
economic liberty or property rights are absolute, then democracy can never encompass 
all aspects o f society. Therefore, in order to justify the evolution of democratic 
principles in the economic arena, Dahl must curtail the belief that property rights are 
absolute.
In the process o f analyzing property rights Dahl poses some questions that 
shed light on his understanding o f the characteristics o f economic and political rights. 
He begins with the assertion, “W hen the claims of different persons to a scarce [my
elections, legislative activity and judicial control -  so that influential minorities at any 
o f theses stages may veto the alternative preferred by a m ajority.”
17 Dahl, A Prefcae to Economic Democracy, 10.
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emphasis] and valued thing are equally valid no person’s claim  is better or worse than 
any other’s.” 18 He continues by setting up a division between rights that are divisible 
or non-divisible. He adds, “ if the thing is appropriately divisible into equal shares, 
each equally valid claimant is entitled to an equal share. ” However, “if the thing to 
be allocated is not appropriately divisible, then each equally valid claim  is entitled to 
an equal chance to obtain what ever is allocated.” 19
Different than this thesis, Dahl sets up the econom ic rights as the non-divisible 
rights. He uses as his exam ples of non-divisible goods a private painting or the 
opportunity to speak at a large meeting. However, his logic is very com patible with 
this thesis. His argument is that the democratic process will have difficulty allocating 
the economic good because people are unwilling to divide the good. Or, in other 
words, there is intense rivalry for the good. As a result, each person understands their 
allocation of the good is at risk from any attempt to divide the good. The division of 
the good becomes the same thing as limiting the am ount o f the good one expects to 
receive.
His logic is more clearly revealed by using his public meeting example. In 
this case, everyone has the right to speak. However, there is a finite resource 
involved. The finite resource is time. Therefore, every speaker views the other 
speaker as a source o f rivalry. Dahl concludes that such a situation can not be 
resolved in a substantive way by the democratic process. He argues that the
18 Ibid., 58.
19 Ibid., 59.
democratic process will only allow for the equal opportunity to acquire economic 
rights, but will not allow for the equal division o f economic rights. Inherent in this 
argument is the understanding that economic rights, distributed by the democratic 
process, will not produce perfect equality. The best the democratic process can 
achieve with respect to economic rights is equal opportunity to acquire economic 
rights. If one adds to that concept the understanding that economic rights attract a 
more intense level o f political participation, it becom es clear that Dahl would accept 
the notion that the distribution of economic rights produces a result similar to the 
scenario he sets up in Figure 5.
AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT
In D ahl’s early work, he focused on differing levels of intensity to explain why 
pluralist systems were not guided by majorities, but more typically ruled by groups of 
minorities. However, Dahl had a difficult time operationalizing the concept of 
intensity. As a result, a student o f D ahl’s work can notice an obvious retreat from 
using the term in his latter works.
Despite this retreat, Dahl still wanted to defend his pluralist model against its 
critics. M any critics o f D ahl’s pluralist model argued that the model was inaccurate 
because it did not account for the fact that 1) not all groups can mobilize to form 
politically active groups and 2) not all groups could participate with the same amount 
o f influence. Dahl is well aware of these criticism s, and in general, agrees with them. 
One way to account for differences in influence is to account for differences in
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intensity. However, because the measurement and identification o f intensity is so
difficult. Dahl began to use differences in wealth to account for differences in
political influence. One possible reason for the shift is that Dahl openly admits that it
is easier to em pirically measure wealth than intensity. W hatever the reason, such a
methodological difference leads a slightly different interpretation o f the causes of
intensity between this thesis and Dahl. W hereas this thesis identifies the type o f issue
[economic right or political right] as the cause for differing levels o f intensity, Dahl
might be more likely to identify differences in wealth among the com peting pluralist
groups as the main cause for participation differences.
O f course, such a conclusion by Dahl develops the possibility of class
differences as an explanation for differing levels of intensity. Dahl often notes that
minorities are not always located in a common geographic location. Some minorities,
especially economic minorities, are dispersed throughout a political unit. Many of
D ahl’s views about how class distinctions cause differing levels of political
participation can be summed up by Michael W alzer. W alzer explains,
The corruptions of American democracy are determ ined by two things: 
the radically unequal distribution of wealth in our society and the 
private financing o f political campaigns. W e can deal with corruption 
in two different ways: by radically reducing the inequality and tolerating 
the private financing or by tolerating the inequality and banning the use
p  • ‘>0of private money."
M ost evidence suggests that Dahl would prefer the first option. If Dahl believes that 
class distinctions are the primary reason for participation intensity differences, then he 
would be less likely to accept the “issue distinction” hypothesis offered here.
20 M ichael W alzer, “Campaing Financing: Four V iew s” Dissent (Summer 
1997), 5-11.
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Political Issues With Zero-Sum Attributes
Another area of divergence between this thesis and the opinions of Robert 
Dahl is the fact that he emphasizes the probability that political issues may result in 
situations where a majoritarian system can not create political consensus. Many 
times, Dahl argues that ethnic and social, conflicts create crises that can not be 
remedied through democratic means. He identifies such conflicts as the crises in 
Lebanon, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka and Spain and the Basque regions as prime 
exam ples.21 Although this appears to be contradictory to the hypothesis of this thesis, 
his arguments are not inconsistent with the application o f collective action theory as a 
developed in this paper.
I have argued that one o f the primary difference between economic rights and 
political rights is that the former typically posses the characteristic o f rivalry, or 
exhibit zero-sum influences. Although this is generally true, there are some political 
rights that also exhibit these characteristics. If a political right does exhibit zero-sum 
gain characteristics, then it is com pletely possible that a “political intensity” graph, 
the graphs Dahl developed in A Preface to Democratic Theory and used earlier in this 
chapter, would look exactly like the graph in Figure 5.
For exam ple, according to the criteria set up in this thesis, abortion would be a 
political right. Obviously, the act o f having an abortion is not subject to rivalry.
There is not a national lim it on how many abortions can be performed and, therefore, 
one woman having an abortion does not deter or limit another woman from having an
21 Dahl, “Democracy, M ajority Rule and G orbachev’s Referendum”, 493.
abortion. However, anyone remotely aware o f the American political landscape 
knows that abortion is an issue that attracts extremely high levels of intensity on both 
sides. In fact, if  one were to graph intensity levels o f political participation with 
respect to abortion, that graph would also look exactly like the graph illustrated in 
Figure 5. Therefore, such a scenario seems to produce a conflict with the notion that 
only the allocation of economic rights will attract high levels o f intensity.
If, however, one were to argue that some political rights exhibit the same 
characteristics o f economic rights, in this case abortion, such a scenario presents less 
of a conflict. Although the act o f performing an abortion does not create a sense of 
rivalry, the political fight over its legality is a strict zero-sum fight. Any increase in 
the freedom to have an abortion is seen as a direct loss by those seeking to restrict its 
application. Conversely, any restriction on the right to have an abortion is seen as a 
direct loss by those seeking to protect the right. The same logic applies to the issues 
cited by Dahl. If the Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland view any 
freedoms/rights allocated to one side as a direct loss of freedom/rights to their side, 
then one should expect high levels of intensity with respect to political participation, 
ju st as if  the two sides were com peting for economic rights within a finite sphere of 
resources.
It is im portant to accept the notion that the dichotomy between economic 
rights and political rights is a general rule, not an absolute rule. In general, most 
rights that exhibit zero-sum characteristics are economic rights. In general, most 
rights that exhibit characteristics o f jointness of supply are political rights. However, 
there are some political rights that have the characteristics of economic rights and
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there are some economic rights that exhibits characteristics of political rights. A 
possible example would be a negative externality such as pollution. Dumping 
pollution into the ocean is technically an economic right. The ocean is finite. 
However, practically, polluters view the dumping of pollution into the ocean as a 
political right because they are not subject to any real sense o f rivalry.
Therefore, Dahl might argue with the assertion that only econom ic rights attract high 
levels of intense political participation but he would probably be more comfortable 
with the assertion that, in general, economic rights attract more intense political 
participation. In fact, if  one were to count the number of times Dahl identifies 
economic issues as a cause o f political gridlock as opposed to political issues causing 
political gridlock, the former would far outnum ber the latter.
C H A P T E R  7
CONCLUSION
Democratic theory is an elusive and multi-faceted topic. There are numerous 
variables which account for different behaviors in dem ocratic societies. This thesis 
has tried to exam ine one aspect of democratic theory in the hopes it may offer a 
helpful insight into creating a more com prehensive democratic model.
In order to narrow the scope o f the study, only the American form of 
democracy was examined. Narrowing the scope even further, it was assumed that the 
philosophies o f James M adison best em bodied the principles of American democracy. 
However, one aspect o f those philosophies, intensity, was the primary focus. 
Therefore, the views o f Robert Dahl were also incorporated into the study. Dahl is 
one o f only a few dem ocratic theorists to attempt to account for differing levels o f 
intensity when developing a democratic model. Therefore, the first step of this study 
was to reconcile the views of James M adison with those o f Robert Dahl. In doing so, 
a clear picture o f how American dem ocracy works on an institutional level (M adison) 
and behavioral level (Dahl) was developed.
Dahl had raised some important questions about intensity but failed to answer 
them. He clearly argued that in order to create a com prehensive model of democracy, 
it would be necessary to understand how differing levels o f intensity affected the 
system. Unfortunately, Dahl became frustrated by his attempts to measure different 
levels o f intensity. He argued that one could identify different levels o f intensity by 
observing different behaviors in a political society, but that an empirical method of 
measuring intensity was beyond the capabilities o f political science. This frustration 
caused Dahl to move away from trying to explain different levels of intensity and
1 2 0
121
concentrate more on differing levels of wealth as an explanation for differing levels 
o f political participation.
This thesis attempted to return to Dahl’s original questions about intensity and 
offer a model that m ight explain why people exhibit different levels of intensity with 
respect to political participation. Rights were divided into two categories, political 
rights and econom ic rights. The distinction between the two types o f rights was 
based on criteria econom ists had developed to distinguish between public and private 
goods. It was concluded that political rights exhibited the same characteristics as 
public goods and econom ic rights had the same characteristics as private goods.
Such a distinction lead to the argument that because private goods and 
economic rights were subject to rivalry and therefore a zero-sum  gain incentive 
structure, econom ic rights would attract higher levels o f participation than political 
rights. Thus, this thesis tried to answer half o f D ahl’s dilemma. It explained why 
people reacted to different issues with different levels o f intensity in the political 
arena, but did not create an empirical measuring system for intensity levels. Nor was 
there an assertion that only economic rights attracted increased levels of intensity.
The criteria rights must exhibit in order to attract high levels o f intensity is rivalry. It 
was suggested that econom ic rights have a greater tendency to exhibit the 
characteristics of rivalry, but there are certain political rights that also exhibit this 
characteristic.
The last step involved postulating how Dahl might respond to my hypothesis. 
By looking at the works o f Dahl, it was concluded that, in general, he would likely 
accept the notion that economic issues are of a zero-sum nature. In addition,
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economic rights, being subject to rivalry, would attract higher levels of intensity. 
However, it was also concluded that Dahl would probably argue that some political 
rights also exhibit zero-sum  gain characteristics and therefore could also attract high 
levels o f intensity. Furtherm ore, it was concluded that Dahl might look to class 
distinctions more than issue distinctions as a cause for differing levels of intensity.
Having drawn these conclusions it is necessary to ask, why is it important to 
understand the difference between economic and political rights? And, why is it 
important to understand the role of intensity in political participation? Most 
democratic theorists seek to predict the behavior o f individuals in democratic systems 
and predict how that behavior will affect the overall system. The ability to predict 
behavior allows for the creation o f political structures that will either promote 
stability, fairness or some other criteria the society has placed value upon. In 
M adison’s case, he was concerned with intense factions so that he could create a 
system of government that would protect minorities and individuals from majorities 
who would seek to abridge their civil rights. In D ahl’s case, he wanted to understand 
the behavior o f intense minorities and try to develop a strategy to protect intense 
minorities from apathetic majorities, and at other times, apathetic majorities for 
intense minorities.
Furthermore, neither Dahl nor M adison devoted much of their scholarship to 
explaining why groups exhibit intensity. M adison dedicates one paragraph in 
Federalist #  10 to explaining the causes o f intensity. He cites human nature and 
unequal distributions of wealth. Dahl also offers little to explain why different levels 
of intensity develop. He too cites unequal distributions o f wealth as the answer.
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However, unequal distributions of wealth does not explain all intense conflicts. Such 
a criteria does not explain the intensity o f conflict in the abortion debate nor in the 
inability o f Congress to deal with Social Security reform. Therefore, some other 
explanation must be put forth to explain why certain groups act intensely on certain 
issues and others do not.
By using the econom ic rights/political rights paradigm, one can predict when 
intense conflicts will occur. Therefore, depending on the normative decisions a 
society makes, that society could develop different m les (other than a simple majority 
rule) when intense conflicts occur. Both M adison and Dahl agree that in times of 
intense conflict, some other method beside m ajority rule should be employed to make 
societal decisions. However, Dahl is extremely vague as to when such an alternate 
method should be em ployed. And M adison created a system that was relatively 
inflexible with respect to using alternative methods in intense conflicts. He mandated 
two-thirds majorities for veto overrides, impeachments and Constitutional 
amendments. However, such an approach makes no distinction between intense and 
non-intense events.
The econom ic rights/political rights paradigm offers an alternative. Because 
the economic rights/political rights paradigm allows for the prediction of intense 
conflicts, new, non-m ajoritarian rules could be instituted when officials know an 
intense conflict will arise.
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